The Cold War's end has seen no let up to spying. If anything, the compound fracturing of Russia's empire made the problem worse for Western intelligence agencies. Now, in the former "evil empire," there is a host of new countries; and all the newly independent ex-Soviet states face challenges of political and economic stability. They were little known and unimportant in the days when Moscow was the center of empire. The new states now have their own espionage, counterintelligence security and military intelligence services. They were formed immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and incorporated the local Committee for State Security (KGB) and Interior Ministry personnel. In the old days, in Europe, Western intelligence officers worked mainly under diplomatic covers from their Moscow embassies - fine when only the Kremlin counted and the now defunct USSR was the prime target.
In theory, there is much work to be done - new languages to learn, new officials and contacts to cultivate and new threats such as nuclear materials theft, drug smuggling and organized crime to monitor. In practice, intelligence agencies collect what their political and military leaders think important. The White House is not particularly interested in former Soviet states - except for their nuclear weapons and materials that might be smuggled to a "rogue" country or to terrorists. The former KGB women and men now working for Ukraine or Kazakhstan are very interested in Washington. Are they working for Kiev and Tashkent or for Moscow?
Though unpleasant, it's logical that the former Soviet states would spy on the West. What could be more important to a newly independent country than inside knowledge of the intentions, perceptions and plans of donor countries and investors? Besides, what can not be used by their own gov- ernment may be valuable in trade - to Moscow, Beijing, Teh- ran, whatever. Economic policy and political intelligence are more important than ever. Competition in cutting edge technologies - bio-tech, composite materials, cryogenics, super conductors, optics and lasers - makes industrial espionage more intense than ever.
However, the former Soviet states are not alone in their quest for political, economic and social information. There are emerging nuclear powers such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea; there are emerging imperial states such as India, desperate for more lebensraum - living space; there are still other states that seek to impose their version of Islamic government across their borders.
China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom have their own political and economic agendas; as even peripheral news readers know each of these countries spy not only on each other, but also on the United States. Certainly, throughout the world the initials CIA are as well known as USA - and sometimes used synonymously. And, within the CIA there is a much repeated - and respected - saying: "There may be such a thing as friendly foreign government, but there is no such thing as a friendly foreign intelligence service."
The oldest professions
Based on Biblical accounts, spying has been called the world's second oldest profession. Sex and spying have been paired for some 4,000 years. Doubters are referred to the story of Joshua's two young men sent to spy out the defenses of Jericho. Where do the two strangers go to lie low, so to speak? To Rahab, a prostitute whose house abuts the town wall close to the gate. When the guards come to arrest the spies, Rahab hides them on her roof. Later in the night, she gives them provisions, directions on how to avoid the patrols scouring the countryside for them, and lowers them by rope over the wall in return for a promise of protection when Joshua captures the city.
Some 1,500 years after Joshua, China's great military strategist Sun Tzu had developed enormous sophistication as a spymaster. He prefaced the chapter of his handbook, The Art of War, on the use of secret agents by emphasizing that no general or ruler could be successful without spies. Foreknowledge of an enemy's decisions cannot be obtained by divination, "by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation."
Sun Tzu wrote of one of the most ruthless tactics - feeding an expendable agent false information to divulge when he is captured.
Sun Tzu described the types of spies used: penetration agents who move among the enemy notables who have access to the inner circles of leadership to collect critical informa- tion, the enemy's spies who have been "doubled," ordinary people in the enemy's country who know the lay of the land and can unobtrusively observe and carry messages and agents recruited among enemy officials. The 9th century A.D. Chinese commentator Tu Mu described the character of these spies unerringly:
"Among the official class there are worthy men who have been deprived of office; others who have committed errors and have been punished. There are sycophants and minions who are covetous of wealth. There are those who wrongly remain long in lowly office; those who have not obtained responsible positions, and those whose sole desire is to take advantage of times of trouble to extend the scope of their own abilities. There are those who are two-faced, changeable and deceitful, and who are always sitting on the fence."
"Tie them to you," said Tu Mu. They will give you the facts of the situation in their country and determine its plans against you; and added, "They can as well create cleavages between the sovereign and his ministers." This is a classic description of the agent of influence.
Marcus Tullius Cicero, patriot of the Roman republic, recognized the danger of traitors. Of the enemy within, Cicero said:
"A nation can survive its fools and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and he carries his banners openly. But the traitor moves among those within the gate freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself. For the traitor appears no traitor; he speaks in the accents familiar to his victims, and he wears their face and their garments, and he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation; he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of a city; he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. A murderer is less to be feared."
The way things were
The spy game contains a fundamental paradox. It is the duty of every government to defend its interests and thus to collect as much information, open and secret, on as many other countries as it can manage. At the same time, it must counteract the spies from the countries spying on it. Obviously, there are priorities since resources are limited. Every government concentrates on the countries most likely to engage in military aggression then on those with an economic noose around their neck. Interest moves outward from the borders, and those interests can change rapidly as the collapse of the Soviet empire showed.
In the years between 1945 and 1990, the intelligence services of Central and Eastern Europe worked for Moscow. The internal security or secret police kept their own people obedient; the foreign intelligence service and military intelligence service spied on Bonn, London, Rome, Paris and backed up the Russians in the United States and Canada. For the past five years, these countries have been in business for themselves. At the end of December, the Ukrainians reported with some glee that the KGB of neighboring Belarus has learned of at least twenty attempts by Poland's "special services" [the favored East European euphemism] to recruit agents in Belarus. It is not amusing to Central Europeans whose countryside has been fought over for more than a thousand years. The devastation of World War II and its aftermath have not faded from memory; and lurking underneath is the recollection that just 200 years ago the Polish Kingdom's eastern borders extended all the way to the Dnieper River and included both Belarus and the western half of Ukraine.
Americans responsible for national parks, forests, public land management, environmental protection with the U.S. Department of the Interior often are taken aback by the reception given them when traveling abroad. In most countries, the Interior Ministry means the secret police, not Smokey the Bear.
Internal spying in the developing countries means the secret police, usually attached to the Ministry of the Interior if they were French or Belgian colonies, or to the Ministry of Home Affairs if Britain was the colonial power. These ministries generally handle the ordinary police, secret police and customs. In Latin America, the secret police may be part of the Ministry of Government, Interior or Justice. In small countries with tight budgets, external spying is often limited to the Foreign Ministry's diplomats, plus military attachees.
Concerned with potential border wars, the military of the Third World worries mainly about bean counting - how many soldiers, tanks, artillery pieces, helicopter gunships do the immediate neighbors and traditional enemies have - monitoring military exercises, and recruiting contacts among the officers and civilian officials of other countries.
No end to spies
The lowering of tensions between Washington and Moscow have not meant any reduction in espionage. Only seven months after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, in an interview with the Russian Defense Ministry's Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], KGB Lt. General Vadim Alekseyevich Kirpichenko, who from 1974 to 1979 was head of Directorate S [illegals] of the KGB First Chief Directorate and for the previous two years was leader of the group of consultants to Russian spymaster Yevgeny Primakov, stated: "I want to note that President Yeltsin and the Russian Government understand the need for us to function normally. We have the necessary minimum." Kirpichenko said that the Russian Foreign Intelli- gence Service (SVRR) and GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff] had "worked out a rhythm of collaboration" and avowed that while they were reducing intelligence activities in countries of secondary interest, "where it is necessary to our state, we shall continue our activity."
And so they do. In January 1995, Britain expelled Aleksandr Malikov, 43, a journalist attached to Russia's government-controlled Ostankino television station. The stated reason, "national security." The United States, to the contrary, has not been expelling spies lately though the SVRR rezident in the Russian Embassy was declared persona non grata after the arrests of CIA traitor Aldrich Ames and his wife in February 1994. FBI counterintelligence agents are aware of SVRR and GRU officers, but they have not been ordered to leave. The word is the White House National Security Council and State Department officials do not want to embarrass Boris Yeltsin at a time when his own security and guard service appears to be taking control of much of the government. It is like the Victorian admonition to children: "Hold on tight, stay close to Nurse, for fear of finding something worse."
With this, Maldon offers a survey of some of the globe's intelligence and counterintelligence services:
Directory of Intelligence Organizations
ALBANIA
OSSh - Organs of State Security - Albania's Sigurimi, part of the former Ministrae Punëve të Brendshme (MPB) [Ministry of Internal Affairs].
ShIK - National Intelligence Service - Albania's post-Communist restructured intelligence service, formerly the Sigurimi or OSSh. Irakli Kocollari is chairman of the ShIK.
Sigurimi - [Security], Albania's foreign and internal intelligence service, the OSSh; reorganized as the ShIK in 1991. The Tirana publication Zeri I Popullit, in an article headlined, "Where are the Sigurimi Collaborators Today?" noted in February 1994 that there have been no revelations of the identities of collaborators, no opening of the secret police files and that the danger of political blackmail continues.
ARAB STATES
Mukharabat [listening post] - the most common term of reference for the intelligence services of most Arab countries including Libya and Syria. In point of fact, the military intelligence services of these countries are the principal foreign intelligence organizations. In addition, the Foreign Ministries maintain information collection groups. In Syria, because President Hafiz al-Assad himself was an air force officer, the Air Force Intelligence is favored.
ARGENTINA
CNI - National Intelligence Center - Argentina's foreign intelligence organization.
SIDE - Secretariat for State Intelligence - Argentina.
SIE - Secretariat for State Intelligence - Argentina.
AUSTRALIA
ASIO - Australian Secret Intelligence Organization. Australia's internal security organization came into being during the early days of the cold war as a counter- espionage agency. Its origins were in Australian military intelligence and General Douglas MacArthur's Allied Intelligence Bureau, established in Melbourne during World War II. The need for more professional intelligence was made plain in the 1970s after the defection of Vladimir Petrov, a KGB agent from the Soviet Embassy in Canberra who told of extensive Soviet operations in Australia. Over the years ASIO has had some successes and some embarrassments.
ASIS - Australian Secret Intelligence Service - foreign intelligence is an organization that can trace its origins to the Coast Watchers, which during World War II was a network of Australian spies on islands overrun by the Japanese.
BELARUS
KGB of Belarus - Mikhail Zhukovets, head of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus, died in Minsk on 13 July 1993. "Officials of the information service of the Belarus KGB refrained from giving details and only stated that the death was the result of an accident," reported Moscow's Komsomolskaya Pravda. Allegedly, "He fell from the 10th floor of a block on the Nemiga, where he lived with his family. . . .But even severely intoxicated, it would not be so easy to topple over the more than meter-high balcony railings."
Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY on December 30, 1994, said, "The press service of the Belarusian KGB has reported that it has more than 20 statements by citizens notifying about attempts on the part of the Polish special services to recruit them for collaboration."
BOLIVIA
DIE - State Intelligence Directorate - Bolivia.
BRAZIL
DSI - Security and Intelligence Division - Brazil.
SNI - National Intelligence Service - Brazil's intelligence agency; closely tied to the Brazilian military institution, the SNI is rumored to have played a key role in Brazil's effort to make its own nuclear weapons and in pre-Gulf war dealings with Iraq.
BULGARIA
DS - State Security, also called Drzaven Sigurnost [Department of Security], Bulgarian security service under Zhivkov regime that was overthrown in December 1989.
CANADA
SIS - Security Intelligence Service. Intelligence agencies lack imagination in their choice of names, and the Canadian agency responsible for internal security and counterintelligence obviously looked toward Australia for guidance when it was formed in 1981. For external intelligence, the Canadians rely heavily on their NATO relationships with the British and the Americans.
Prior to 1981, Canada's internal security problems were the responsibility of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which investigated the terrorist Quebec Liberation Front with all too much enthusiasm. As a result a number of RCMP officers were accused of illegal wire-taps, breaking and entering and acts of provocation.
In August 1994, charges were made against the SIS that they too had been involved with illegal acts in investigations of neo-Nazi groups and racism in an army unit. Other charges were made that their investigations extended into the activities of journalists working for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Canadian Jewish Congress. Critics were charged with violating the Official Secrets Act but were quickly released.
CHILE
CNI - National Information Center - Chile's intelligence service. Under the junta of General Augusto Pinochet, it was formerly called the DINA. The name was changed after the scandal exposing the DINA responsibility for political assassinations of Chilean opponents in exile, among them the shooting of General Rene Schneider in Rome and the car-bomb murder of former Defense Minister Orlando Letelier, killed in Washington, D.C.
DINA - National Intelligence Directorate - Chile's former intelligence service - name changed to CNI.
DINE - Chile's Army Intelligence Directorate; not to be confused with the former DINA.
CHINA
Nicholas Eftimiades, author of the only modern book- length study of Beijing's espionage and secret police network [Chinese Intelligence Operations. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994], criticizes the shortsightedness of the U.S. intelligence agencies who dismissed China's wholesale spying for years. China has the world's largest army, but it never developed the force-projection capabilities needed to invade another Asian country or to take Taiwan from the Nationalists. Thus, Beijing's spying goes largely unmonitored by the CIA abroad and by the FBI's counterintelligence division at home, says Eftimiades. The FBI disagrees.
Yet, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of 1995 is strikingly different from the one that existed in 1979 when Deng Xiaoping's economic liberalization began. In 1979, China's huge army was mocked for its lumbering, incoherent invasion of Vietnam that bogged down a few miles inside Vietnam's border. China naval arm was a coastal patrol service; the air force flying knockoffs of 1950s-vintage Russian MiGs. As for China's nuclear forces, they were mounted on a relatively small force of missiles of dubious accuracy. Their role was believed to be mainly a deterrent to the Russians.
Over the past ten years, China has made great strides in modernizing its army. China has transformed the naval forces from a coast guard into the beginnings of a bluewater navy capable of exerting Beijing's claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands and their presumed reserves of petroleum and natural gas. China has a comprehensive missile development program and is an exporter of short-, medium- and intermediate range missiles to the volatile Mideast. Intelligence sources report that for many years China and Israel have had a secret arrangement under which Israel uses nuclear and missile test facilities around the legendary Lop Nur [90 degrees E. 40 degrees N] in western China. Recent reports indicate some U.S. technology found its way into Chinese missiles via this route. Ironically, against the interests of both Israel and the United States, China is selling missiles with a range up to 1,200 miles to a variety of Mideast countries.
To a considerable degree, China's military-industrial complex is supported by an espionage apparatus second to none in size. China's espionage operations go beyond mere information collection and industrial espionage to penetration of U.S. intelligence. In 1988, Harry Godfrey, III, then head of the counterintelligence section of the FBI field office in Los Angeles, stated, "If we are talking about violations of U.S. law, the Chinese are surpassing the Russians. We know they are running operations here. We have seen cases where they have encouraged people to apply to the CIA, the FBI, Naval Investigative Service, and other Defense agencies. They have also attempted to recruit people at our research facilities at Los Alamos and at Lawrence Livermore." Last April, the Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. spy catchers avowing that in terms of sheer numbers, China's espionage efforts vastly surpass those of Russia or any other nation operating in the United States; and they pointed to the case of convicted PRC spy Bin Wu as typical of operations involving theft of restricted technol- ogies.
The PRC's intelligence, counterintelligence and secret police agencies include the following:
GAB - Ministry of State Security, usually known by the English acronym (MSS). The MSS is a creation of Deng Xiaoping's modernization of state structures, having been formed in 1983 by the merger of the espionage, counterintelligence and internal security functions of the Investigations Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MSS cooperates with the MPS in cases dealing with possible disloyalty among returning Chinese students and dissidents.
Since 1985, the MSS has been headed by Jia Chunwang, a member of the CPC Central Committee. Jia, a 1964 graduate from the engineering physics department of Qinghua University, earlier was responsible for loyalty and counterintelligence as secretary of the Beijing Party Committee for Discipline Inspection. Jia's deputy ministers oversee the geographically based foreign intelligence bureaus.
Arrests and exposures of China's intelligence operations in various countries over the past three decades demonstrate extensive use of both "legal covers" [accredited diplomats, military attachees, governmental trade representatives] that give spies some protection [they are expelled, not jailed] and "illegals" - journalists, students, scientists, businessmen without diplomatic status who face imprisonment if caught. Among the covers given to Chinese intelligence officers abroad are positions with the CPC's International Liaison Department, the New China News Agency (XINHUA), Chinese People's Friendship Association, the trade offices and trade missions. China's illegals, supplied with expertly forged or sometimes genuine identity papers and passports, may set up shop in the West in the guise of being Singaporeans, Thais, Hong Kong or Overseas Chinese of varied citizenships. This has been especially true of illegals involved in running commercial fronts used to obtain and ship banned dual-use technology home to China.
China's greatest publicized success was its penetration agent, Larry Wu-tai Chin [his name also is transliterated Jin Wudai]. U.S. officials say he held the rank of deputy bureau chief of the GAB/MSS.
Chin was arrested in November 1985. According to Chin's confession to three FBI agents shortly before he was arrested - a confession he unsuccessfully attempted to suppress - in 1942, after he had become a translator on the staff of the U.S. Army Liaison Office in Fuzhow, he was recruited to the Communist Party of China. Later, the espionage department of the CPC was amalgamated with the Ministry of Public Security into the MSS. In the Korean War, Chin was an interpreter during the interrogation of Chinese POWs and informed his superiors of what sorts of information the Americans were seeking and which prisoners cooperated. In 1952, Larry Chin joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He was awarded the CIA's career intelligence medal when he retired. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1965.
Chin was far more than a mere translator of open source radio programs and newspaper articles. He did as much damage to U.S. interests in Asia as Aldrich Ames did to interests in the Soviet Union. According to the 17-count indictment against him, Chin "reviewed, translated and analyzed classified documents from covert and overt human and technical collection sources" and "was involved in and aware of the West's intelligence requirements" regarding the People's Republic of China and efforts to obtain the information to meet those requirements. For much of his career, Chin was a "document control officer" who routed "finished intelligence products" through the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, Departments of State and Defense and the White House. Chin had access not just to materials on the PRC, but to the entire body of analytical intelligence - the "finished intelligence products" - on all of Asia, including the National Intelligence Estimates that are a cornerstone for policy development, national intelligence requirements on the PRC and all other Asian countries, and reports on the Asian countries originating in other government agencies sent to the CIA for review or filing. Since one of the principle centers for Western intelligence operations regarding China is the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, the language of the indictment about "the West's requirements" indicated Chin may have been able to betray some British or U.S.-British cooperative intelligence programs.
During the period of the Vietnam war, Chin would have been able to provide details of U.S. policy, planning and operations in Indochina. Virtually everything that passed through his hands, Chin stole and copied for Beijing. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), most probably citing a defector, stated that the volume of materials obtained by Chin was so great that each delivery of filmed U.S. intelligence documents took two months to completely translate. In addition, he cultivated other CIA employees of Chinese ancestry, especially those with relatives still on the Mainland, to obtain information to help Beijing recruit them. He followed the parameters recommended by Sun Tzu precisely.
A federal jury in Alexandria, Virginia, convicted Chin of 17 charges including six counts of espionage. He faced a maximum sentence of life imprisonment plus 83 years imprisonment and $3.3 million in fines. Sentencing was scheduled for March 17. On February 21, 1986, Chin apparently used his shoelaces to tie a plastic garbage bag around his head while lying on his bed and suffocate himself although he was in a suicide watch cell in which prisoners are to be checked every 30 minutes around the clock.
In the United States, the GAB/MSS has a huge manpower pool to draw on for services: 1,500 PRC accredited diplomats and commercial representatives; 70 PRC offices, agencies and establishments; 10,000 members of various scientific, trade, commercial and political delegations visiting for a period of up to several weeks each year; 15,000 Chinese students arriving in American universities and a large ethnic Chinese-American community. Make no mistake, the overwhelming number of Chinese-Americans have no love for the Beijing regime, but Beijing is ruthlessly manipulative of feelings of ethnic solidarity, general pride in China's emergence on the world scene and family loyalty; so it hunts for those that Beijing can manipulate.
The June 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy uprising in Beijing and scores of other Chinese cities brought defections of many PRC diplomats and GAB/MSS officers, who detailed the efforts of the intelligence ministry to intimidate and control the overseas students and scientists. The first secretary at the Washington Embassy, Wang Zurong, was especially active against the PRC students at the University of Maryland in College Park. Another MSS officer, Wang Weiji, defected and described his activities against the students; but his bona fides were questioned when his wife returned to Beijing.
The GAB/MSS often sends agents abroad as a married couple, but with the woman being the lead agent.
MID - Military Intelligence Department of the People's Liberation Army's General Staff Department (GSD). The MID, also known as the PLA's Er Bu [Second Department], is China's second-largest intelligence agency. The primary customers for the Er Bu's intelligence product are the Central Military Commission (CMC), the core guarantor of the security of the People's Republic, and the GSD. Other recipients of Er Bu products include the Ministry of National Defense, the service headquarters, the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and other elements of the military-industrial complex and unit commanders.
One of the more intriguing parts of the Er Bu is the Beijing Guo Zhanlue Yanjiusuo [Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS), which also is called the Beijing Guoji Zhanlue Xuehui [Beijing International Strategic Studies Association]. The BIISS is staffed almost entirely with current and retired military officers and many divide their time between the Military Intelligence Department and the institute. The Er Bu Analysis Bureau works especially closely with the institute. A Chinese defector described the BIISS to Eftimiades as "our window on the world" that allows the PLA's military intelligence to make contact with foreign specialists in foreign policy and sound them out on various issues.
Major General Xiong Guangkai, a professional military intelligence officer in his late fifties, heads the Er Bu. Xiong reports to a deputy chief of the GSD. Nicholas Eftimiades noted that China's military spies are building a new breed of officers with ample famil- iarity with the West, Xiong's personal aide, Colonel Li Ning, for example, was a military attachee in London in the late 1980s where he identified new Mideastern markets for Chinese weapons and sought to acquire "advanced technology with military applications." In 1990, Li completed graduate work at the prestigious School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), an affiliate of Johns Hopkins University.
Other sources report that during the 1980s, the Er Bu and GAB/MSS pressed scores of graduate and post-graduate students into service, especially those in research departments and institutes involved with biotechnologies, optics, communications technologies, advanced physics, chemistry and mathematics, cryogenics, laser research and medicine. Research fellows in these fields often have access to research papers of other teams submitted for peer-review, and to papers on new technologies at early development stages before they are officially classified. "A vacuum-cleaner approach" was how one U.S. official described it.
The Er Bu may number China's First Family among its members. Take the intriguing career of Deng Xiaoping's highly influential youngest daughter, Deng Rong. In the late 1970s, after graduation from the Beijing Medical School, she joined the CPC and the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, which has intelligence as well as ideological functions. She also joined the Communist Party. In 1979, the year formal U.S.-PRC relations began, her husband, He Ping, received a fast-track position in military procurement and military intelligence.
Deng Rong then changed her name to Xiao Rong and with her husband was dispatched to China's Embassy in Washington. For the next four years, the couple worked at the embassy for the PLA's General Political Department (GPD) collecting information. Rong expanded her contacts with Americans by taking a course in government management at American University. After their return to Beijing, Deng Rong was appointed deputy director of the Policy Research Institute of the National People's Congress.
COLOMBIA
DAS - Administrative Department of Security - the secret police of Colombia with responsibility for combatting drug trafficking, the leftist insurgencies and the rightist death squads. The DAS's expedient use of the Cali narcotrafficantes to decimate the Medellín cartel in the 1991-1993 period has allowed the Cali cartel to assume the leadership of the drug export business.
CUBA
DGI - General Directorate of Intelligence - Cuba's foreign intelligence service. The DGI operationally is under Ministry of Interior (MININT) and First Vice Minister for Security, with the DGI chief's rank being vice minister. Its many notable successes include multiple and simultaneous penetrations of the CIA using "dangle" agents. It would appear that virtually every Cuban citizen the American CIA thought was working for them during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s - and very likely even now - were under DGI career spies or individuals coopted by Havana. The DGI chief in the 1960s, Manuel Pineiro Losada, known for his coloring as Barbarossa [Red Beard], was shifted to command Cuba's other foreign intelligence service, the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee. DGI and Americas Department personnel are highly interchangeable. The difference is that revolutionary armed struggle in the Western Hemisphere was run from the party's Americas Department to give the illusion of separation from the government should captured guerrillas and terrorists talk. In cases like Mexico, where Castro was on especially good terms with the government and valuable trade and political ties were at risk, Cuba would shunt revolutionary trainees to cut-outs like the Soviet Union, North Korea and Nicaragua for training.
DIM - Military Intelligence Directorate - of Cuba.
DSE - Department of State Security - Cuba's provincial-level secret police.
CYPRUS
KIP - Cyprus Intelligence Service.
CZECH REPUBLIC and SLOVAKIA
BIS - Security Information Service - counterintelligence service of the Czech Republic; the only one of the four Czech intelligence services answerable to the parliament. Formed in December 1992, before the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, from the division of the Federal Security Information Service (FBIS). Czech democrats accuse the revamped security service of continuing former State Security Service secret police work. The director from December 1992 through August 1993 was Stanislav Devaty.
CZS -Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, replaced StB after the collapse of the Communist system in the Velvet Revolution of November 1989. One of the four Czech intelligence services formed after the collapse of the Communist government along with the BIS [counterintelligence]; military intelligence and military counterintelligence.
FMV - Federal Ministry of the Interior - The Czech Republic internal security ministry, currently under Jan Ruml. Also known as the MV.
FSZS - Federal Directorate of Intelligence Services - the Czech Republic's central intelligence organization.
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MBV - Local Security Committee - part of the former Czech secret police network.
NVB - National Security Board - the coordinating body for Czech intelligence.
ObZ - Counterintelligence - Czech Republic.RNB - Reditelstvi Národní Bezpecnosti - National Security Directorate of Czech Republic.
RNB - National Security Directorate of Slovakia.
SB - State Security - Slovakia's secret police.SNB - National Security Corps, Czechoslovak internal security unit.
StB - State Security Service, Czechoslovakia's foreign intelligence service. Reorganized in 1990 as the CZS.
SVKR - Military Counterintelligence Headquarters - Czech Republic.
UIS - Central Information Service - of the Czech Republic.
UNB - National Security Office - of the Czech Republic.
USB - State Security Headquarters - Slovakia.
VKR - Military Counterintelligence. The VKR was part of the Interior Ministry until reorganization in 1990. The military counterintelligence authority was given to the army and the name changed to Military Defense Intelligence (VOZ). In August 1993, the VOZ director, Colonel of the General Staff Petr Luzny, maintained that not a single KGB or GRU agent had been found in the VOZ.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
DNS - National Directorate of Security - Dominican Republic.
EGYPT
GIA - General Intelligence Agency. The GIA was set up in the 1950s with the help of former Nazis working for General Reinhard Gehlen. The GIA is responsible only to the president, and has almost unlimited powers. It carries out both espionage and counter-espionage and in some cases police work. Working alongside it - and sometimes in competition with it - is another organization, Mahabes el-Aam, the Secret Police, which comes under the Ministry of the Interior and deals with internal and political security.
Egypt's Mukhabarat has a reputation for torture and cruelty and remains a potent force inside Egypt, if not in the world outside. It is noted that a degree of cooperation exists between the GIA and the FBI as shown by the use of the FBI of a GIA officer as a central informant in the on-going prosecution conspirators related to the World Trade Center bombing case in New York City.
FRANCE
DGSE - Directorate General for External Security - the French foreign intelligence service. Prior to reorganization ordered by President François Mitterrand in 1981, the DGSE was called the SDECE - a barely pronounceable acronym even in French. Its headquarters are in a disused barracks in Boulevard Mortier, Paris, near a municipal swimming pool, giving rise to the word piscine being used as a slightly pejorative nickname for the service. The DGSE is an intensely political organization that because of changing national directives has been embroiled in a number of scandals of typical French complexity.
The DGSE has the awesome responsibility for guarding the French investment in America - rumored to be in the region of $13 trillion - mainly in electronics, space engineering and telecommunications. By reputation, the DGSE has an aggressive collection program that extends to such James Bond-style escapades as downloading the hard drives and diskettes of business executives traveling in France, rummaging through their checked luggage at airports, stealing brief cases carried by business executives flying on Air France and photocopying the contents and installing microphones in the headrests of Air France's trans-Atlantic flights. The DGSE was the lead agency in the 1985 in the surveillance of the organization Greenpeace, then attempting to disrupt French nuclear tests in the Pacific. The DGSE campaign led to the sinking of the Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior, capture of two French intelligence officers and considerable embarrassment to the French government.
DST - Directorate for Territorial Surveillance - French internal security and counterintelligence. The DST, like its sister service, the DGSE, is often involved in politics. It is largely composed of ex-police officers. The DST is the lead organization in France's internal efforts in detecting and arresting foreign spies in France and in dealing with subversion and counterterrorism. In recent years the DST, under the Interior Ministry, has taken a lead against Islamic political extremists and terrorism in France. DST also employs the resources of the Renseignements Generaux, another police service, which keeps track of foreigners, political and labor union militants.
GERMANY - EAST
HVA - Main Reconnaissance Administration. Founded in 1952 as part of the MfS under the semi-legendary Communist spymaster, Markus "Mischa" Wolf, who led the HVA until his retirement in 1987, the HVA penetrated the highest echelons of West German government and intelligence. HVA agent Günther Guillaume became the private secretary and political confidant of Chancellor Willy Brandt. Guillaume's arrest in 1974 forced Brandt's resignation. Noting the large number of unmarried secretaries, women in their thirties and forties, working for top NATO, intelligence and government officials, Wolf organized seductions by HVA officers - and endless secrets flowed to East Berlin - even from the desk of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Examination of HVA archives (not all were spirited to Moscow) led to the arrests of the HVA spy ring in NATO codenamed "TOPAZ." Its leaders, Ann-Christine Rupp and Rainer Rupp, were convicted by a German court in November 1994.
MfS - Ministry for State Security, East Germany; headed by Erich Mielke; dissolved with unification in October 1990. The HVA and SSD were divisions of the MfS. The Mfs played a major role in providing support services during the 1970s and 1980s to Mideastern and international terrorist organizations.
SSD - State Security Service, East Germany's secret police; known as the Stasi. Since unification of Germany in October 1990, some Stasi agents have been arrested and charged. There is no amnesty for those who worked for East Germany.
GERMANY - FEDERAL REPUBLIC
BfV - Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution - West German counterintelligence agency. The BfV has uncovered more than eighty East German spies in the West since unification. The agency also is responsible for investigating terrorists and political extremists.
BKA - Federal Office of Criminal Investigation - carries out the criminal investigation and collection of evidence to bring counterintelligence and security cases to court for prosecution. In the United States, the FBI is responsible for both counterintelligence investigations, which are informational in purpose and thus may never come to a trial, and the criminal investigation function of the BKA.
BND - Federal Intelligence Service - [West] German foreign intelligence, founded after World War II by Reinhard Gehlen.
The BfV, BKA and BND are coordinated from the office of the German Chancellor. Early in October 1993, Minister of the Chancellery in charge of coordinating the German intelligence services Bernd Schmidbauer and Eckart Werthebach, the BfV president, received Iranian Intelligence and Security Minister Ali Fallahian-Khuzestani in Bonn for a "working visit." This brought an interagency feud because Fallahian's ministry directs the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign intelligence service, known as SAVAMA. The BKA linked Iranian intelligence operatives to the assassinations on September 17, 1992, of four anti-Tehran leaders of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iran, including the party's secretary general Sadeq Sharafkandi, while they were meeting for dinner in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin during a conference of the Socialist International. The trial commenced just as Fallahian paid his call. Shortly after Fallahian's red-carpet treatment in Bonn, the BKA leaked a copy of its report, "Overview of Danger in Iran: Activities of the Iranian Intelligence Service in Europe." Apparently, Fallahian was offering a trade: a reduced sentence of dismissal or charges for his hit-men in exchange for Iranian purchases of German goods.
GREECE
IPA - Protective Security Service of Greece.
KIP - Central Intelligence Service of Greece.
KIPE - Central Radio Monitoring Service.
KIPE - Central Information and Investigation Service, Greek internal security.
SPA - Intelligence and Security Council.HAITISID - Service d'Information et de Documentation - Information and Documentation Service - Haiti.
HUNGARY
AVB - Hungary's State Security Service; formerly known as the AVH and AVO. Reorganized in February 1990 under Colonel Istvan Dercze into Office for Constitutional Protection, using the name patterned on the West German security service to indicate a break with the communist Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP). Hungarian foreign intelligence became the National Security Office, headed from 1990 to March 1992 by Andras Galszecsy. The nominee to replace him, Ambassador to Germany Attila Csenger-Zalan, resigned and declined after newspapers reported he was tried for causing a fatal traffic accident in 1989. The old AVB III/I Main Directorate [budget $18 million] handled foreign intelligence, the III/III Main Directorate internal security. The AVP played an important role in training and harboring international terrorists during the 1970s and 1980s.
AVH - State Security Authority of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior from the late 1940s until the 1956 Hungarian revolution. The AVH replaced the AVO (Magyar Allamrendorseg) Allamvedelmi Osztalya [State Security Department (of the Hungarian State Police). In common usage, the two acronyms were used intrchangeably.
INDIA
RAW - India's Research and Analysis Wing - Pakistan's enemy number one. RAW played a major role in December 1994 in uncovering a case of sexual entrapment by female spies, sale of secret information on rocket engines and missile programs for large sums of money, and a spate of arrests. This all happened in Trivandrum, capital of the southern state of Kerala where the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has its headquarters. A young women from the Maldives was arrested for a very minor visa offense. Allegedly, she told investigators that Dr. D. Sasikumaran, 55, a deputy director of ISRO, would vouch for her. The police called in counterintelligence experts. Questioned by the RAW officers, Sasikumaren provided sufficient details of the lurid relationship to bring about the arrest of a second, older Maldivian woman as she was trying to leave the country, another ISRO deputy director named Nambi Narayanan and the local agent of the Russian space company Giavkosmos, Dr. K. Chandrasekharan. The investigation continues. In this case, Pakistan is the "usual suspect."
IRAN
IRGC - The Pasdaran [Guards] have units engaged in both political and military intelligence. The IRGC also is linked to technology acquisitions. A special operations unit known as Al-Qods Forces [Al-Qods is the Arabic for Jerusalem] is suspected of having provided the hit-team that killed former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and an aide in their suburban Paris home in August 1991. The killing of leading exiles is believed to be approved by Iran's Higher Security Council. Members of the Council include President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Minister of Intelligence and Security Ali Fallahian-Khuzestani, Majlis, Speaker Mehdi Mahdaui Karrubi and Ahmad Khomeini, the late ayatollah's son. The IRGC intelligence section, headed by a mullah named Sa'edi, has been suspected of involvement in supporting the Lockerbie bombing in December 1988. Also allegedly involved in assassination operations against political exiles is the shadowy Organization of the Revolution.
SAVAK - Iranian Security and Intelligence Organization - the intelligence of the Shah of Iran. The name was changed to SAVAMA under Ayatollah Khomeini's regime. SAVAMA reports to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (VEVAK), headed by Ali Fallahian-Khuzestani.
IRAQ
Mukharabat [Listening Post]. Iraq's intelligence service is euphemistically called the Public Relations Bureau. It was established soon after the Ba'ath Party seized control in 1968 and it controls all aspects of political, military and economic life and carries out intelligence and other operations abroad. In 1973, a secret pact between Baghdad and Moscow was concluded under which Iraq's internal security was reorganized on KGB lines and Iraqi security officers were trained in KGB and GRU schools in Russia. In return, the Public Relations Bureau provided assistance to Soviet missions where it was difficult for the Russians to operate.
ISRAEL
AMAN - Intelligence Wing - the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) intelligence arm. Formed in 1948 from the Information Service (acronym Shai) of the Haganah, the Defense Force formed before partition by the Jews of Palestine.
LAKAM - Science Liaison Bureau - a top secret Israeli intelligence unit whose principal responsibility was gaining access to nuclear weapons technology. LAKAM's existence was uncovered with the arrest in 1986 of Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew working for the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) in Washington. LAKAM was abolished because of the scandal. Pollard volunteered to spy for Israel. Pollard had an active fantasy life and wanted to be a spy since college. He was rejected by the CIA as "unreliable" but held a courier's job at NIS that allowed him access to many documents and gave him an excuse for removing documents. Pollard's offer was shuffled around Israel's intelligence services until LAKAM chief Rafi Eitan took it up. Pollard and his wife were well paid. Though the Pollards were paid some $2,500 a month in addition to their normal income, they had no rich bank accounts or possessions. Published reports indicated extensive crack cocaine use by both Pollards at parties. Apparently their Israeli spying money went up in smoke. They were preparing to sell secrets also to China when arrested.
Their public flight to the Israeli Embassy for asylum [they were expelled and arrested after the Israeli government decided to cut its losses] and the vast amount of information Pollard betrayed caused a bitter rupture in relations between Israel and the U.S. intelligence community. A little polite snooping by an ally is one thing, dealt with when it becomes irritating with a note to the effect that "Your man is causing an embarrassment," followed by his or her withdrawal. Wholesale theft and disclosure of identities of American counterterrorism agents in the Mideast is something else. As for the argument that it is not serious if one is spying for an ally, one goes back to first principles. Every country has its own agenda. Once a secret is divulged to another government, it may be traded or sold to a third party. The spy has no control over how the information he or she discloses will be used. Last March, despite intense lobbying by Israel's Prime Minister and some Americans for a presidential pardon, President Clinton acceded to the recommendations of the Justice Department, Defense Department and CIA that clemency be denied Pollard.
MOSSAD -The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations - Mossad [the Institute] is Israel's foreign intelligence service. It developed a tremendous mys tique in the 1970s and 1980s. Criticism began for such failures as the mistaken assassinations of a Moroccan waiter in Lillehammer, Norway, in 1973. The waiter was thought to be Fatah special operations commander Ali Hassan Salameh, the "Red Prince" of the "417" of "Force 17" unit. Norwegian police arrested six members of the support and surveillance team. Other actions, like the 1988 raid in Tunis in which the PLO commander called Abu Jihad was killed, were condemned in the West. More recently, Mossad has been under fire for not being able to prevent the bombings of Israeli embassies and Jewish charities in Buenos Aires and London. Only a lucky traffic accident prevented a truck-bomb attack on the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok in March 1994.
Shin Bet - General Security Service - Israel's internal security service. Responsible for guarding against terrorist attacks, it has developed a reputation for ruthless illegal behavior such as the killing of captives and perjury as docu- mented in the Landau Commission report in 1987. Shin Bet is the target of many complaints of human rights abuses.
ITALY
SID - Defense Intelligence Service of Italy, name changed to SISMI.
SIE - Army Intelligence Service of Italy.
SIFA- Armed Forces Intelligence Service of Italy.
SISMI - Intelligence and Military Security Service - Italy's military intelligence, named changed from SID. Watchword of Italy's intelligence services is "SS" - the abbreviation for "segretissimo" [top secret].
JAMAICA
DISIP - Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services, Jamaica's all-purpose intelligence department.
JAPAN
Japan has five major intelligence organizations, all of which are governed by a separate Cabinet ministry, making it difficult to coordinate collections and operations. These are:
Naicho - the Bureau of Investigation and Information - a group of some 500 experts and analysts working in a small building near the residence of the prime minister, to whom the Naicho reports. It has no "action service" but rather focuses on providing information and analysis to its governmental customers.
Defense Agency - has a special bureau that operates electronic intelligence complexes in Wakkanai, in the extreme north, where interest focuses on the Russian fortress of Vladivostok and closer bases in the Kuriles.
Foreign Ministry - has its own Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis.
Koanbu - The Public Security Bureau of the police is responsible for counterintelligence and counterterrorism.
Koanchosa-cho - Agency for Investigating Public Security - is under the Justice Ministry and has between 6,000 and 8,000 employees in offices across the country.
MITI - Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Omitted from public discussion in Japan of its intelligence and security constellation is its brightest star, MITI, whose industrial espionage activities are considered by Japanese officials to be potentially embarrassing and thus extremely sensitive. The reason is that MITI's targets are not so much declared or probable enemies like China, North Korea or Russia, but political allies and major trading partners among the industrialized Western democracies. According to Western sources, MITI operates the most comprehensive network of industrial espionage agents in the world, often in consort with various Japanese industries to whom it feeds high-technologies obtained via subterfuge and stratagem. Japan recently announced it would seek to develop enhanced computer security. This is prompted by the discovery that personal computers emit electromagnatic waves as keys are struck and these can be intercepted by ELINT antennas.
KAZAKHSTAN
KNB - Committee for National Security of Kazakhstan - was formed on June 20, 1992. The KNB leadership includes chairman Sat Tokpakbayev and deputy chairmen (ethnic Russians) Leonid Dagayev and Yuri Serebryakov. Following Moscow's lead, the KNB has a public relations department headed by Karabi Mukhanbetkaliyev.
KOREA - NORTH
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) retains two espionage services, the Research Department of theKorean Workers Party (KWP) and the Reconnaissance Bureau of the General Staff Department of the Korean People's Army (KPA). Until his death last summer, both answered to KimIl-sung, who was both general secretary of the KWP and president of the DPRK. However, since the early 1980s, actual direction of the Research Department and Reconnaissance Bureau is believed to have been in the control of Kim's heir and apparent successor, Kim Chong-Il, who turned 53 on February 16, 1995.
In 1978, Kim Chong-Il ordered the kidnapping from HongKong of South Korea's most popular actress, Choi En-hui, anda few months later kidnapped her husband, South Korea'sleading film director, Shin Sang-ok. After being kept inprison for five years, they agreed to cooperate with KimChong-il's plan to revitalize DPRK film industry. Theyplayed their roles so well that they were permitted to attend a film festival in Vienna, Austria, in March 1986,and were able to escape. Among the documentary evidence ofthe role of Kim Il-sung and Kim Chong-il in their kidnappingwere their tape recordings of Kim Chong-il's visits to their home and a photograph he gave to Choi En-hui of his meetingwith her on the dock minutes after her captors brought her ashore. In it, Kim is holding her hand. Her head is bowedand slightly averted.
Details of the KWP Research Department's espionage terrorist operations were provided by Kim Hyon-hui, after her arrest. Miss Kim and a veteran Research Departmentoperative, Kim Sung-hui, 70, posed as a Japanese father and daughter, traveled with their control officers from Pyongy-ang to Moscow, then to East Berlin, Budapest and Vienna where they were given expertly forged Japanese passports,tickets connecting them to a Korean Airlines flight, a bomb concealed in a radio and a liquid accelerant disguised as whiskey. The two left the aircraft in Abu Dhabi but failedto make connecting flights. After KAL Flight 858 disap-peared, passport checks of those who got off in Abu Dhabi led to their discovery and arrest. Both Research Department agents bit on cyanide capsules, the older agent died, Miss Kim survived. In her confession, she said that two days before starting out on this assignment, senior Research Department officials showed her a hand written authorization for this attack from Kim Chong-il. She also signed an oathswearing to carry out her "combat mission" and "fight to the death for the lofty authority and prestige of the beloved leader." "Beloved leader" is the title of Kim Chong-il.
The incident prompted the State Department to add theDPRK to its official list of governments supporting interna-tional terrorism that should be kept in isolation. That position appears to have been superseded by the recent bilateral U.S.-DPRK agreement in Geneva. On February 15,1995, Congress was informed that the shipment of 50,000 tonsof U.S. oil sent to North Korea intended to fuel civilian power plants to replace electricity from the closed down nuclear reactor at Yongbyon was being converted for military use; but that the United States had protested.
KOREA - SOUTH
South Korea's foreign intelligence and security agencieshave earned a reputation for ruthlessness stemming partlyfrom the fact that the Republic of Korea (ROK) remains atwar with the DPRK. The perpetual state of war on a crampedpeninsula where the ROK capital is only some 40 miles fromthe Demilitarized Zone and where infiltration for decadesmade for a society in which the military, security andintelligence agencies not only directed policy, but kid-napped political opponents from third countries and deposedpresidents. Democratization in South Korea during the 1980sand 1990s appears to have limited many excesses. Studentradicals still protest the existence of the National Secu-rity Law.
KCIA - Korean Central Intelligence Agency, now the ANSP. Arguably, the most notorious scandal involving the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which feared that the post-Vietnam United States would withdraw U.S. military forces from South Korea. The KCIA's solution was to set up Tongson Park as a bribery and influence peddler. The former KCIA director defected to the United States and gave detailed testimony to Congress and the courts. Two former and four serving U.S. Members of Congress were charged with taking KCIA bribes routed through Tongson Park. In October 1979, as the KCIA scandal wound down in Washington, KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu shot and killed President General Park Chung Hee, who had ruled the ROK since his military coup in 1961.
It is noted that the South Korean YONHAP news service reported last July that former KCIA officer Bo Hi Pak, principal deputy of Unification Church Leader the Reverend Sun Myung Moon and director of the Moon business empire, went to Pyongyong for six days and participated in the funeral ceremonies for Kim Il-sung. Seoul's Choson Ilbo reported that Pak had sent a message of condolence praising Kim Il-sung before his visit, that he attended the funeral and memorial service, laid wreaths at the "Great Leader's" bier and expressed his "deep condolences" to Kim Chong-il. In his press statements, Pak said that in the Pyongyang guest house he was given, the servants, including two young maids and cook, were weeping over Kim's death, and added, "My eyes also filled with tears when I saw the compatriots crying. It was similar to the sorrow of losing a parent." The ROK government retaliated by revoking Pak's licence to publish seven Unification Church publications.
ANSP - Agency for National Security Planning [also known by the acronym NSP] - the Republic of Korea's intelligence agency, headed by Kim Tok. In September 1994, the ANSP announced its first public seminar. The topic was "How to Protect Industrial Secrets." Now, and not coincidentally, the ROK's intelligence agency makes economic information gathering its "top priority. The ANSP chief Kim Tok in a recent report to the Republic of Korea's President Kim Yong-sam reportedly stated the agency would emphasize collection of economic, industrial and environmental data to help South Korean industries prepare for the "coming era of borderless competition." Kim Tok added that "information services for the private sector will be increased to make the ANSP an intelli- gence agency in which the people have full trust." President Kim Yong-sam reportedly responded by expressing his hope that the ANSP would grow into a "world- level information and intelligence agency." Kim Tok's address followed earlier reports that the ANSP is putting more emphasis on collection of foreign technology. The article noted that despite a hiring freeze, the agency intends to hire more science and technology experts and "specialists in industrial intelligence." Efforts reportedly were being made to attract individuals with advanced degrees able to collect and evaluate economic and industrial intelligence. The paper added the ANSP also plans to "augment this portion of the personnel it sends overseas."
LITHUANIA
Lithuania - State Department of Security of Lithuania - General Director (as of May 1994) was Jurgis Jurgelis, 51, who is the eighth to hold the post [after M. Laurinkus, D. Arlauskas, V. Zedelis, Z. Vaisvila, B. Gajauskas, P. Plumpa and K. Mickevicius].
MEXICO
DFS - Federal Security Directorate - Mexico.
DIPD - Intelligence Department of the Federal District Police - the most important secret police organization of Mexico.
NICARAGUA
DGSE - Nicaragua's General Directorate of State Security.
PANAMA
SNI - the intelligence service of Panama, works closely with the United States.
PAKISTAN
ISI - Inter-Services Intelligence - Pakistan's all pervasive intelligence service is controlled by the military. The ISI has assets throughout the country's leadership sectors - political, scientific, commercial and religious. It is responsible for direction and control of the country's nuclear weapons program and defense buildup, including clandestine technology acquisitions and for maintaining cordial relationships with China. During the Afghanistan war, ISI became a major sub-contractor of the CIA, managing the operation of Afghan refugee camps and the training and arming of the mujaheddin. With hostilities in Afghanistan no longer of interest to Washington, the ISI lost favor because of its nuclear program and reported excesses on the Kashmir border. The ISI recently sought to regain American favor by cooperating in the arrest of a prime suspect in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
PERU
DIE - Special Investigative Division - part of Peru's internal security network.
DIGIMINT - Interior Ministry Intelligence Division - part of Peru's internal security and counterintelligence network.
DINCOTE - Counter-terrorism Directorate - the section of the Peruvian National Police responsible for combatting Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA).
DIRSEG - State Security Directorate - Peru.
SNI - National Information System of Peru.
POLAND
BOR - Personal Security Bureau - Polish physical security service for the president and other high officials; formed after the breakup of the SB in 1990; headed in April 1993 by Colonel Miroslaw Gawor.
KOK - National Defense Committee - Polish intelligence and security directorate; transformed into RBN in January 1991.
RBN - National Security Council, replaced the KOK, founded January 1991. Polish national security council under presidential [Lech Walesa] direction; devised the reorganization plans for a National Guard, removing military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Poland and assuming some functions of the Border Guard, police and fire brigade in dealing with disturbances, natural disaster and combatting terrorism. Headed [till June 1994] by Jerzy Milewski, who simultaneously was deputy minister of national defense, and is the father-in-law of Andrzej Kozakiewicz, 37, one of Lech Waleas's closest aides and his economic secretary. In June 94, Walesa appointed as RBN head Henryk Goryszewski, former vice president of the Christian National Union (ZChN) and a reserve military officer.
SB - Security Service; reorganized in February 1990 as the UOP.
UOP - Office of State Protection [Office for State Security] - the post-Communist Polish intelligence service formed in February 1990 to replace the SB. In 1994, when President Lech Walesa decided to replace UOP chief Jerzy Konieczny, his replacement choice was Poland's premier spymaster, Marian Zacharsky. Masquerading as a Polish businessman, Zacharsky ran an American spy called William Bell, who stole the plans for U.S. advanced radars on the F-15 fighter, the Patriot anti-missile system and the then-proposed Stealth aircraft. Zacharsky was arrested by the FBI in 1981, sentenced to life and traded back to the Polish Communist regime in 1985. The U.S. government objected strongly to Zacharsky's promotion. Three days after being named as UOP chief, Zacharsky was forced out.
Ze-2 - Poland's "G-2" military intelligence service.
PORTUGAL
DGS - General Directorate of Security - Portuguese internal security.
DINFO - Portugal's Military Intelligence Division.
PIDE/DGS - International and State Defense Police/General Security Directorate, Portuguese internal security.
PVDE - Surveillance and State Defense Police - Portuguese internal security.
SIED - Defense Strategic Intelligence Service, analytical functions of Portuguese military intelligence (SIM).
SIM - Military Intelligence Service of Portugal.SIS - Serviço de Informaçôes e Segurança - Intelligence and Security Service - Portugal's foreign intelligence.
ROMANIA
DIE - Foreign Information Department, Romania's foreign intelligence service under Nicolae Ceausescu, who was executed in putsch on December 25, 1989.
SIE - Foreign Intelligence Service - post-Ceausescu.
SRI - Romanian Intelligence Service - the current name. The SRI director since 1991 [nominated by the president and confirmed by the parliament] is Virgil Magureanu. In May 1992, the National Conference of the Romanian Journalists' Association (AZR) demanded Magureanu's resignation after a reporter was forced to resign because he was a former Securitate informer. The SRI maintains relations with corresponding intelligence services, and has hosted Russia's SVRR chief, Yevgeni Primakov.
RUSSIA
CHEKA - Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage founded by Lenin on December 20, 1917, days after the Bolshevik putsch, with Feliks Dzerzhinsky as its chief. The name was simplified as the Vserosiiskaya Chrezvychainaya Kommissiya (VChK). In the late 1980s, amidst glasnost, an American foreign-policy official who visited the KGB administrative headquarters in the Lubyanka was pre- sented with a small bust of Dzerzhinsky. "My favorite Pole!" he exclaimed. "How so?" asked the KGB's public relations chief. The response, "He killed more Russians than all other foreigners put together." Not funny to the Russians who estimate 40 to 60 million people died in the gulags, forced labor camps, deportations, famines and tations, famines and executions carried out by the Chekists. The term is still used for the members of Russia's "organs of state security" and December 20 even now is an unofficial holiday celebrating the secret police.
FAPSI - Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the president - FAPSI, established by a Boris Yeltsin decree of December 24, 1991, is the first Russian officially acknowledged electronic intelligence (ELINT) organization. It was carved from the former KGB and put under the command of Lieutenant General Aleksandr V. Starovoytov.
FPS - Federal Border Service - The FPS was formerly the KGB Chief Directorate of Border Guards. The Border Guards were cut out as a separate service in December 1991, placed in the Security Ministry, then on December 30, 1993, Yeltsin issued another edict making the guards a sepa-rate organization. An edict of January 10, 1994, put the FPS under presidential control. Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev is its chief. The FPS has ministerial status and membership in Yeltsin's Security Council.
FSB - Federal Security Service. On February 15, 1995, the Russian State Duma [parliament] changed the name of the FSK and charged it with responsibility for intelligence, counterintelligence and the "fight against all types of crime."
FSK - Federal Counterintelligence Service, formed from the KGB's Second Chief Directorate by decree of Boris Yeltsin on December 21, 1993, headed by Security Minister Nikolay Golushko (simultaneously, the Security Ministry was dissolved). In 1994, Golushko was replaced by Sergey Stepashin. The FSK had half the former staff of the Security Ministry and was to concentrate on combatting foreign intelligence activities on Russian soil, terrorism, drugs and weapons.
FSK Deputy Director and Moscow FSK Chief Yevgeny Savostyanov was fired by Yeltsin on December 2, 1994, just two hours after he went personally with an armed FSK force to the Most Bank at request of its chairman Vladimir Gusinsky [a flamboyant Jewish millionaire, who is a main financial backer of the YAVBLOKO parliamentary group] to find out the identity of the armed raiders. The raiders turned out to be the Presidential Security Service (SBP) under General Korzhakov plus, perhaps, some forces from the GUO.
GRU - Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. The top generals of the GRU traditionally are taken from the KGB. The GRU is said to have had primary responsibility, along with the military intelligence agencies of the Warsaw Pact countries, for managing the training of members of terrorist and so-called national liberation movements during the 1970s and 1980s. Western counter- intelligence agencies state that GRU espionage and technology acquisition is as energetic as ever.
GUO - Main Directorate for Protection, Yeltsin's separate presidential security organ. In his 1994 autobiography, Yeltsin noted that in August 1991, leader of the KGB Ninth Chief Directorate, that included the Kremlin bodyguards of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, controlled all security and communi- cations and thus General Plekhanov was able to isolate Gorbachev during the coup attempt. Wrote Yeltsin, because of Plekhanov's treachery, "we were simply afraid to take career bodyguards." The GUO was formed by a Yeltsin edict early in 1992 combining the Kremlin Commandant's Office and the former KGB Ninth Chief Directorate. The GUO chief is former Kremlin Commandant Mikhail Barsukov. The GUO and the Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Prezidenta [Presidential Security Service] conduct joint measures and share a number of support services. Both GUO and SBP provide physical security teams to guard Russia's leaders, their offices, cars, apartments, dachas, institutions, ministries and departments, plus a whole range of secret "objects of state importance" that include sanatoriums and vacation homes received by the president as gifts from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) before Yeltsin banned it.
According to Moscow sources, both the GUO and SBP are involved in surveillance operations, videotaping with hidden cameras and monitoring telephone conversations. Also there are reports of unconventional methods, such as a woman named Dzhuna who terms herself a "channeler of bio-energy" and is said to influence Yeltsin by way of astrology.
The GUO and SBP have their own analytical subdivision, whose work extends to the political and economic situation in the country. The prime analysis center is located outside the Kremlin at 5 Varvarka Street which houses a staff of some sixty people, it is under the supervision of SBP deputy chief Georgiy Rogozin, who previously had worked for the KGB's Fifth Directorate. Rogozin's work was initially concerned with operations against dissidents, but later was said to involve matters such as extrasensory perception and telepathy in order to divert the attention of people from politics.
The GUO is estimated to have a staff of 25,000, of whom some 5,000 are assigned to the SBP. The pay of the GUO lower ranks is about one and half times that of their colleagues from the other special services. GUO officers earn three times as much as officers of equal rank in the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The GUO budget for 1995 is reported to be 600 billion rubles, approximately the same amount as allocated to the entire Russian Procuracy that employs more than 40,000 people.
Comparatively, the former GGB Ninth Chief Directorate had some 8,700 personnel; and the entire KGB, some 35,000. The "Niners" provided guards to both people and facilities across the entire Soviet Union, with between ten and twenty guards being assigned to the entire Moscow "nomenklatura" dacha settlement; now every dacha is guarded by up to 20 GUO officers with the numbers of dachas increasing as state bureaucrats proliferate. Each politician provided with protection has, on average, several dozen bodyguards, with the prime minister and General Korzhakov having more than a hundred each. The GUO and SBP are both provided with electronic communications and have been issued with Val silent combat assault rifles. The GUO includes the Alpha special purpose unit that operationally is under the command of Korzhakov, as it was the last time that it was activated in the autumn of 1993 against the parliament.
In Russia, the term "in operative subordination" indicates that a regiment, brigade or division are supported at the expense of the Defense Ministry budget and their personnel are shown on the Ministry's "order of battle," not on that of any other agency, such as the GUO or SBP. Thus, since 1993 the 118th paratroop regiment, the 27th special-purpose motorized infantry brigade and an amphibious assault division, all regular military formations with armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, tanks, rocket launchers, etc., are now available to Generals Barsukov and Korzhakov for security purposes, without reference to the Defense Minister, General of the Army Pavel Grachev.
Members of the parliament's Security Committee charge that the GUO and SBP at this time have neither legislative nor judicial authority and operate solely under the executive authority of President Yeltsin. Security Committee chairman Viktor Ilyukhin has proposed altering Russian law to bring the GUO and SBP under the control of Stepashin's Federal Counterintelligence Service; however General Korzhakov has suggested merging the FSK into the GUO and SBP, in effect restoring the KGB.
KGB - Committee for State Security, Soviet Union; reorganized in October and December 1991. Immediately after the attempted coup of August 1991, RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin began breaking up the KGB. Stage one was to rename the KGB the Agentstvo Federalnoy Bezopasnosti (AFB) [Agency for Federal Security] on November 26, 1991. The First Chief Directorate [foreign intelligence] under Yevgeny Primakov was made an independent organization, initially named the Central Intelligence Service. On December 18, 1991, by decree Boris Yeltsin renamed the foreign intelligence service the Sluzba Vneshnyaya Razvedka Rossiyi (SVRR) [Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (RFIS or FIS)].
The KGB's Second Chief Directorate of KGB [counterintel- ligence and counterespionage], incorporating parts of the former KGB Third Directorate [counterintelligence, ensuring military loyalty] and Ninth Directorate [physical security of officials] were merged into the Interrepublican Security Service (ISS). Yeltsin then merged the ISS, the former USSR Internal Affairs Ministry and his own Russian Federal Security Agency into a superagency - the RSFSR Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs, headed by General Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov, who had no intelligence or security experience. This superagency did not last long. In 1993, the former Second Chief Directorate was made the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) under Sergey Stepashin.
KGB responsibilities also included "wet affairs" - assassinations of political opponents and defectors. Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin positively revels in his role in providing the Bulgarian Security Service with the umbrella gun that fired a pellet containing the deadly poison ricin into the leg of Bulgarian exile Georgi Markoff in 1977. Currently, Kalugin is teaching a course at the Catholic University in Washington, "Perspectives on the Collapse of the Soviet Union."
MB - [Ministry of Security]. On January 24, 1992, Yeltsin decreed that the Agency for Federal Security consisting of the internal security and counterintelligence elements of the former KGB were now the Ministry of Security. By an edict of February 25, 1992, Yeltsin placed the Ministries of Security, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Justice directly under his office; the SVRR was put under presidential control on October 7, 1992. The Ministry of Security was abolished by a Yeltsin decree of December 21, 1993, on the grounds that as successor to the KGB it was "unre- formable." In its place, he created a smaller service, the FSK. Other parts of the Security Ministry were transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and FAPSI.
MVD - Ministry of Internal Affairs.
SBP - Security Service of the President. The SBP is headed by Boris Yeltsin's closest confidant, General Aleksandr Korzhakov. Korzha- kov was assigned as Yeltsin's personal security man in 1985, when he was raised to the Politburo by Gorbachev. Korzhakov then stuck with Yeltsin through his political disgrace and removal from the Politburo. After the October 1993 tank attack on the parliamentary rebels, Yeltsin rewarded the efforts of his personal guards headed by Major General Aleksandr Korzhskov by transforming the guard section [part of the "Glavnoye Upravleniye Okhrany (GUO) from January 1992 until November 1993] into the SBP with the status of an independent federal agency. In December 1994, the SBP staged an ostentatious show of force when they raided the Most Bank in the center of Moscow and roughed up the bank's head, the opulent and flamboyant Vladimir Gusinskiy - as a general warning against supporting any rival to Yeltsin - a warning that was sufficient for Gusinskiy to send his wife and son urgently to Germany.
The SBP now is producing policy analysis and public statements on economic and social conditions and the war in Chechnya. The SBP has its own press office, headed by Andrey Oligov, yet remains a most mysterious and disturbing special service. The function of the SBP's press office is not to give out information, but to deal firmly with the press, to investigate publications writing about the security services and "work on" excessively curious authors. SBP press office officials in recent weeks have been circulating compromising material on certain Kremlin bureaucrats, members of the Duma and Moscow businessmen.
There is no specific decree on record in the Kremlin's list of presidential ukases showing precisely how or when the SBP was formed and placed under the command of General Korzhakov, who reportedly was a mere major in October 1993 when he distinguished himself in the attack on the parliamentary White House. It is believed that it was separated out of the GUO in January or February 1994.
SVRR - Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (RFIS or FIS) - formerly the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. The KGB was reorganized in October and December 1991 after the attempted coup of August. Yeltsin's first step was to rename the KGB the Agentstvo Federalnoy Bezopasnosti (AFB) [Agency for Federal Security] on November 26, 1991. The First Chief Directorate [foreign intelligence] under Yevgeny Primakov was made an independent organization, initially named the Central Intelligence Service. On December 18, 1991, by decree Yeltsin renamed the foreign intelligence service SVRR.
SOUTH AFRICA
BOSS - Bureau of Special Services - South Africa's former foreign intelligence service, nicknamed BOSS was held in thrall for decades by the powerful and relentless General H.J. "Lang Hendrik" van den Bergh. Linked to bombings and assassinations of South African communists and liberation fighters in exile, BOSS caused such intense resentment in the countries in which it operated, that in 1978, Van der Bergh was retired and the service restructured.
NIS - National Intelligence Service - replaced the discredited BOSS. The NIS was led by Niel Barnard, an academic foreign-policy expert who seemed to correct some problems; but in retrospect it would appear that many changes were largely cosmetic.
SASS - South African Secret Services - the NIS was reorganized again after the installation of a multiracial government in 1994. Mike Louw is the present director general of the SASS. Recently, Louw said, "Many people have a negative perception of us as an element of the apartheid system. There is a general feeling of animosity and suspicion. We have to change that. In fact, we have shifted dramatically, in direction and nature."
The present service has developed a different strategic perspective from that of the military, which believed communism was the primary bogey, and indeed to be fought first in places like Angola and Mozambique. The NIS, in secret dispatches and to the aggravation of its critics, insisted that a political solution at home was a prerequisite for peace and stability.
Louw followed up his recent remarks with a statement that any other spymaster could make: "We need to establish our own identity. Intelligence is really an infamous form of work. That it has to be done by people of integrity is basic. So is loyalty to the country and dedication. We have worked very hard to build that culture here. Unfortunately, our image has a negative effect on recruiting, and the people we do attract can be attracted for the wrong reasons. That's why it can take up to six months to process a job application. We do polygraph and psychometric tests. We have to be sure we have the right people."
SPAIN
DGS - General Security Directorate - Spain's security and protection department was established in 1977, when Spain became a democratic constitutional monarchy after the death of Franco. Originally, the DGS was responsible for internal and external affairs; but later it was split into four services, the advantage being that, as in America and Britain, they can keep an eye on each others' activities.
DIE - Division of Foreign Intelligence, Spanish foreign intelligence.
DII - Division of Internal Intelligence, Spanish domestic intelligence service.
DC - Counterintelligence Division - Spain's spy-catchers.
SWEDEN
Fst/Und - Defense Department General Staff/Intelligence Section. Sweden's controller of the MUST.
MUS - Military Intelligence and Security Service - Sweden.
SÅPO - Security Police, Sweden's internal security agency. The current head of SÅPO, Anders Eriksson, claims that the Russians are still spying on Sweden; but they are after industrial secrets. Spies serving Soviet authorities earlier are now returning to Sweden calling themselves "businessmen." Bugging telephones and fax machines is a common method. SÅPO is aware of cases when spies have paid bribes to go through the garbage of well-known industrialists. In October 1994, when SÅPO released its annual report, it noted that spying by the Russian military intelligence (GRU) had not decreased at all.
TK - Security Committee, Swedish intelligence.
TURKEY
MIT - [Turkish] National Intelligence Organization [English language acronym "TNIO" also is used].
UKRAINE
GRU-Ukraine - Main Intelligence Administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. On July 6, 1993, Major General Oleksandr Skipalskyy was appointed chief of the organization. He has spent half his life in the "special forces." He was educated at the KGB College in Moscow; in 1990, he abandoned the CPSU. He was to have been fired on September 1, 1991; but because of the attempted Moscow coup, he became chief of the Counter-espionage Administration at the Ukrainian National Security Service. In July 1993, he was transferred to the Defense Ministry to lead the military intelligence service.
SBU - Security Service of Ukraine - Colonel General Valeriy Malikov is chief of SBU. He was born in 1942 in the town of Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast and graduated from Kharov University. He then was recruited by the local KGB. Malikov was approved as SBU chairman on July 12, 1994, by the Ukraine Supreme Council.
UNITED KINGDOM
DIS - Defence Intelligence Service. A part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the DIS is the elite political, economic and defense intelligence analytical unit that utilizes all sources of intelligence - signals intelligence from GCHQ, human intelligence from MI6, counterin- telligence from MI5, materials from the MoD's Joint Air Reconnaissance Centre at Brampton, Cambridgeshire, and materials gleamed from military attachees and overseas military missions. A study by former Chief of Defence Intelligence Sir Derek Boorman completed last fall recommended a cut of 20 million English pounds in the DIS budget of less than 70 million pounds.
GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters at Cheltenham - the most secretive of Britain's intelligence services, GCHQ, handles signals intelligence, electronic intelli- gence intercepts and code breaking. With its satellite - linked dishes at Cheltenham and at outstations abroad, including Cyprus and Hong Kong, GCHQ monitors telecommu- nications and other electronic signals. It employs more people and spends more than MI5 and MI6 combined. The director of GCHQ is Sir John Adye. He reports to the Cabinet Office's Joint Intelligence Committee, whose members include the chiefs of the other British ser- vices. GCHQ has a cooperative relationship with the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). GCHQ, which employs some 6,000 people, is undergoing severe staff cuts. In 1994, 200 positions were closed and another 500 will be axed as part of a government cost-cutting program.
MI5 - the Security Service - the United Kingdom's internal security and counterintelligence organization has only within the past few years been formally acknowledged as a part of the British government. MI5's current chief is Stella Rimington, a career spy catcher. MI5 is currently under attack from the regular police who feel it is about to move to take over investigations of drug trafficking based on a speech Rimington gave to the City of London Police on November 3, 1994, when she said MI5 would "where appropriate, use our intelligence resources to collect evidence in support of a prosecution." Critics of the monarchy see danger from the fact that MI5 is not part of the Civil Service and that it's motto, Regnum defende [In defense of the Realm], implies it would defend the Crown against Parliament. MI5, which took over the counterterrorism responsibilities of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch in 1992, lacks arrest powers and must call in the Special Branch whenever arrests are to be made.
MI6 - Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) - the foreign intelligence service of the United Kingdom. The great shadow over MI6 is its penetration by the five Cambridge spies in the 1940s and early 1950s - Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Harold "Kim" Philby, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. In more recent years, MI6 handled KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky as an "agent in place" for a decade. Then, when he came under suspicion as a result of Aldrich Ames at CIA and was recalled to Moscow, MI6 was able to spirit Gordievsky out of the country.
UNITED STATES
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 in response to the Cold War. CIA relied on many demobilized operatives of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and organizational advice from the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), better known as MI6, though unfortunately, the MI6 liaison was Harold "Kim" Philby, the "third man" in the Russian's Cambridge spy ring. The influence of former OSS operatives remained for decades in CIA's Operations Directorate. One of the best-known Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI), Allen Dulles [1953-1961], spent much of the war in Switzerland encouraging the German resistance to kill Hitler and shorten the war. He resigned after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. His successors, also OSS veterans, pondered any number of assassination attempts against Fidel Castro and the Congo's leftist Patrice Lumumba, but their schemes seemed to suffer a peculiar "passive-aggressive" syndrome - all talk and planning, no results. Inexpli- cable until Castro's DGI took to Havana television several years ago with a documentary showing that scores of Cuban citizens the CIA thought worked for it were penetration agents of the DGI - including those who were supposed to kill Castro.
The decline of the CIA's reputation can be traced to the Vietnam war period when inaccurate predictions and projections regarding North Vietnamese actions and intentions began to be interpreted as "intelligence failures" by a Congress and public inclined to think of clandestine activities in "James Bond" terms. In 1973, two scandals erupted: Watergate, in which the CIA collaborated with the Nixon White House in providing information as well as disguises for ex-CIA officer E. Howard Hunt; and clandestine efforts to prevent the election of Marxist Salvador Allende as president of Chile in 1970. At a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1973, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms unexpectedly was sworn; and once under oath, he was asked by Senator Stuart Symington, "Did you try in the CIA to overthrow the government of Chile?" "No, sir," answered the DCI. Symington then asked, "Did you have money passed to the opponents of Allende?" "No, sir," he replied again. By the time Helms pled guilty in 1977 to two charges of lying to Congress, was fined and given a prison sentence of two years (suspended), DCI William Colby [September 1973 to January 1976] had divulged to the Church Commit- tee hearings the bag of dirty linen known as the "Family Jewels," displayed on the hearing-room table exotic assassination devices, and confirmed to a newspaper reporter the existence of mail intercepts on letters from the Soviet Union and a domestic counterintelligence program called Operation CHAOS, which used the name of the enemy side from the 1960s spy spoof, Get Smart.
In operations against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact during the late 1970s and early 1980s, we now know that the CIA had tremendous successes in penetrating the KGB and Pact intelligence services and obtaining the cooperation of scientists and researchers. Now, a full year after his arrest, as the debriefing of Aldrich Hazen Ames continues, recent reports indicate that more than 100 CIA operations and scores of people cooperating with the United States were betrayed during his more than nine years work for the KGB and that he may have been recruited by the KGB during his 1981-1983 tour of duty in Mexico. The Ames investigation showed that every Russian agent the CIA was running in the mid-to-late 1980s was killed or caught and "turned" by the KGB. Likewise, every agent in East Germany and many in other Warsaw Pact states.
Aside from Ames, the image of the CIA gleaned from the headlines is that it has been all downhill since the 1970s. Until hospitalized to die of brain cancer, President Reagan's choice for Director of Central Intelligence, OSS veteran William Casey, while doing much to rebuild the morale of the Agency, worked personally to the exclusion of many other matters at being the case officer for Central America at a time when Marxist insurrections in Nicaragua and El Salvador were spreading throughout that region. Several CIA clandestine services officers had their careers ruined because they were directed by Casey to work with White House aide Colonel Oliver North's "off-the-shelf" and unauthorized contra support program. This program was subsequently linked to the supply of materiel and munitions to anti-communist groups in Central America and the unlawful import of narcotics into the U.S.
After some years of quiet in the late 1980s under former federal judge and FBI Director William Webster and career intelligence officer Robert Gates, the CIA was blamed for not knowing in 1990 that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein planned to invade and annex Kuwait. In fact, America's intelligence satellites focused mainly on the Soviet Union to provide early warning of imminent attack, assess the wheat and barley crops, count tanks, missiles and ships under construction or at anchor, and perhaps to electronically monitor various Russian communications. Saddam Hussein had to signal his military buildup by inviting journalists to travel from Kuwait by road north to Baghdad. Then the United States took plenty of photographs showing tanks, trucks and supplies moving south. However, based on Saddam's record for bluffing, U.S. officials did not think there was a serious threat of invasion. Washington's inaction [and limp instructions the State Department gave Ambas- sador April Glaspie] were interpreted by Saddam as a signal the United States would not object seriously if he took Kuwait. The Gulf war showed why highly placed human agents who can, in Tu Mu's words, "give you the facts of the situation in their country and determine its plans against you," are essential.
As a result of the Ames case, CIA paradoxically has worse morale than in the 1970s. Instead of a triumphant "Gotcha!" and satisfaction that Ames will never step outside a maximum security prison again, there is lamenting over all the operations he betrayed. Clin- ton's DCI James Woolsey made numerous political gaffes, starting in 1993 when he authorized giving the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a blunt, unflattering and fully truthful profile of deposed Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Critics said Woolsey should have realized that Aristide was the protegee of the Congressional Black Caucus, whose support the president needed in the 103rd Congress and that the document might be leaked. At the same time, other critics asked how the DCI in this day and age can refuse or falsify information demanded by Congress. Woolsey, was again perceived as fumbling again in September 1994, when he imposed minor punishments on eleven former and serving CIA officers for their part in not having detected that Ames was working for the Russians. A number of Ames' former superiors who recommended him for promotion or transfer despite his heavy drinking and mediocrity had already retired. The consensus in Congress, more concerned with vote-getting than justice, was that those who remained should have been made an example of by immediate firing and loss of pensions. Woolsey also was blamed by the media for the CIA's "old boy" club atmosphere in which females are regarded as clerks and secretaries, not as suitable Operations Directorate officers. An atmosphere that had existed since the Agency was formed. The New York Times reported that in July 1994, Janine Brookner, the CIA's first woman chief of station, filed a sex discrimination suit in federal court. Allegedly, she was the first to officially report Ames' flagrant flouting of CIA security rules and if her recommendations had been followed, he would have been fired several months before his spying career for the KGB started. Instead, in malicious retaliation for doing her duty and trying to remove drunken, incompe- tent, wife-beating male CIA officers, her career was ruined. Woolsey, although he was not serving as Director, or had any association with the CIA during the Brookner days, was, of course, held responsible.
Operating on a budget of $3 billion, CIA is one of the smallest sectors of the total $28 billion U.S. intelligence budge. With morale currently at rock bottom, U.S. foreign intelligence faces reorganization and down-sizing under the Clinton administration's new nominee as Director of Central Intelligence, retired Air Force General Michael P.C. Carns, 57, a decorated veteran of 200 missions in the Vietnam War, a military manager with a Harvard business degree termed by other Air Force generals "a good wing man" literally and figuratively. Carns has absolutely no experience running intelligence operations. It will take more than the change of the top man to shake up and shape up a CIA that seems determined to shoot itself in the foot. A case in point, this month the Operations Directorate circulated an e-mail message over the internal computer system asking CIA employees to identify everyone in Congress with whom they have "mutually respectful relationships with congressional members," a "working relationship" or "school or family ties." The e-mail message was promptly leaked and interpreted as an illegal lobbying effort. Yet it is equally clear that the United States will need an improved intelligence agency in the late 1990s and twenty-first century. Intelligence and counterintelligence agencies are expensive and, since human, fallible. However, a nation-state is a sitting duck for its enemies without one.
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA provides foreign intelligence and counterintelligence for the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon commands. DIA coordinates the information collected by the intel- ligence services of the Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy. DIA also assigns the military attachees (senior officers from all four services) to U.S. embassies. In peacetime circumstances, the U.S. attachees conduct open liaison with the host country's military. In volatile situations in peacetime, military attachees do become actively involved in covert intelligence activities. DIA's budget is some $600 million.
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation - the U.S. counterintelligence agency also has responsibility for preparing evidence in federal criminal cases for prosecution and for what remains of domestic intelligence. The FBI's counterintelligence role has faced increasing constraint since the early 1970s when the burglary of the FBI Field Office in Media, Pennsylvania, gave leaders of the pro-Hanoi left in the United States access to classified counterintelligence files. The broad informational sweep of counterintelligence investigations, "dirty tricks" against Moscow-controlled Communists, black militants and civil rights figures, and widespread use of "technical sources" [wiretapping] opened a broad and prolonged attack on the FBI. From having been viewed as one of the most respected government institutions, the FBI's public image plummeted. The public sense of outrage over being let down allowed varied interests - the left that had been trying to get the FBI abolished since the Rosenberg spy ring was rounded up, supporters of North Vietnam and the Vietcong, college students who did not want to be drafted for Vietnam, civil libertarians who believe government should be blind to all political activity, ordinary citizens of varied concerns who viewed the FBI as an enemy - to encourage Members of Congress to excoriate the FBI.
The public view came to be that any mention of a person or organization in the index of a counterintelligence investigation meant the FBI was building a case for prosecution or was targeting them unfairly for "dirty tricks." While reforms of the FBI were essential, the total lack of effective response from senior FBI offi- cials and the shakeups that followed the death of the FBI's founder and sole director to that time, J. Edgar Hoover, left that image standing. By the late 1970s, the FBI had ended domestic counterintelligence. Coun- terterrorism investigations of the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), as an agency of the Soviet Union, and a limited number of terrorist criminal groups, some based in ethno-religious communities [Croat, Puerto Rican, African-American, Hispanic, Armenian, Central American, Jewish, Identity churches], continued. Some counterter- rorism investigations also came under attack by powerful members of Congress.
In part, some attacks on the FBI have had a partisan element to them. Documentary evidence obtained in El Salvador and disseminated openly by the U.S. State Department showed that the Salvadoran Communist Party, assisted by Cuban intelligence officers attached to the Cuban U.N. Mission in New York and leading members of the CPUSA, collaborated in 1980 to establish a solidarity organization for El Salvador's Marxist insurgents. The "trip report" of the Salvadoran who established the solidarity network, Farid Handal, brother of the Salvadorean Communist Party chief, noted that the CPUSA arranged his meeting with Congressman Ronald Dellums, who became a leader of the solidarity group, called CISPES. The solidarity lobby had an impact on public opinion and the decision of the Democratic Congress to cut funds for the Republican Central America policy. Thus, the Democratic Congress was embarrassed when CISPES obtained part of its FBI files under the Freedom of Information Act. By that stage, Dellums was chairing a House Armed Services subcommittee and was a senior figure in the Congressional Black Caucus. The FBI director and senior officials apologized for their "mistake" - which was investigating a group with power- ful political connections. Exposing real and alleged misdeeds of the FBI and alleged quirks of J. Edgar Hoover remain part of the regular diet of commercial networks, cable programming and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
China's great military theorist Sun Tzu stated the principle of counterintelligence as concisely as he did that of intelligence: "It is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you. . . ." They should be well paid, comfortably housed and given instructions to operate as an agent in place for as long as possible, he said. This is one of the FBI's most critical responsibilities. The Supreme Court confirmed the government's duty to conduct foreign and domestic counterintelligence activities. In 1967, Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote in U.S. v. Robel (389 U.S. 258), "The Constitution of the United States is not a `suicide pact.' The Nation has the right and duty to protect itself from acts of espionage and sabotage and from attempts to overthrow the Government."
In the mid-1980s, the FBI scored some spectacular counterintelligence successes. Using information provided by defectors from the Soviet and Warsaw Pact states and well as information volunteered by American citizens, many spies were arrested. Among the better known spies apprehended by the FBI between 1984 and 1985 were: Ernst Forbrich, a West German who bought military secrets from U.S. military personnel in the United States and Germany for 17 years; Edward Lee Howard, the dismissed CIA case officer who escaped to Moscow; Thomas Cavanagh, an engineer at Northrop arrested for trying to sell the "Stealth" technology in a "sting" set up after the FBI intercepted his call to the Soviet consulate in San Francisco; Ronald Pelton, a fired National Security Agency (NSA) technician; William Holden Bell, a Hughes project manager in the Advanced Systems Division who from 1978 to 1981 sold advanced radar secrets to the Poles (and Soviets) via his case officer, Marion Zacharski; John Walker and his friends-and-family spy ring in the U.S. Navy; James Harper, who sold Polish and Russian intelligence a huge array of materials on the Minuteman missile system obtained via his mistress who worked for a defense contractor; the swinging Czech illegals Karl and Frieda Koecher, penetration agents trained by Prague's StB, who were the CIA's chief Czech translators; CIA operations staffer Sharon Scranage, who gave secret documents to her Ghanaian intelligence officer lover; and, of course, the FBI's sole known defector to the KGB, counterintelligence agent Richard Miller, who gave the KGB, via his Russian emigré mis- tress, Svetlana Ogorodnikova, a secret document outlining U.S. foreign intelligence collection priorities.
At the same time American spies were being caught, the FBI had a good success rate with "dangle" operations in which an American acting under FBI instruction pretends to want to sell secrets to the Russians. When the KGB takes the bait, the U.S. government quietly or publicly, depending on the state of bilateral relations, declares the offending intelligence officers persona non grata. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States has been very restrained in PNGing members of the SVRR and GRU. Aleksandr Iosifovich Lysenko, counselor of the Russian Embassy and the SVRR rezident in Washington, was expelled after the arrest of the Ameses, since the intelligence officers marking signals for meetings overseas with Ames worked under his direction.
The FBI still has problems: the public remains ignorant of the difference between informational investigations for intelligence purposes and evidentiary information for court proceedings; many Americans are highly sensitive to privacy issues; unsophisticated FBI agents still write memos and directives easily held up for ridicule; the FBI institution has been sluggish responding to social changes regarding the admission of African- American, Hispanic and female special agents; and inept handling of criticism on the part of the senior FBI officials has made the agency the butt of jokes - "Flaming Bad Investigators."FBI Director Louis Freeh, a former FBI special agent and federal judge, has faced widespread criticism for the FBI's mishandling of the Branch Davidian siege under his predecessor, former Judge William Sessions, who refused to resign and had to be personally fired by President Clinton. At the same time, Freeh is carving out a larger niche for the FBI, expanding the Bureau's international law-enforcement role against organized crime and narcotics trafficking. This has meant the opening of FBI liaison offices in a number of foreign capitals, including Moscow. The FBI's forensics laboratories are world renowned. FBI counterintelligence scored a great coup against the Russians and the CIA in February 1994 when after an investigation of nearly a year in which their superior number of trained counterintelligence investigators collected the evidence needed to terminate the spy careers of Aldrich Hazen Ames, 52, and his Colombian-born wife, Maria del Rosario Casas Ames, two "moles" for the Russian KGB who worked inside the CIA. As a result, the FBI Counterintelligence has been given increased authority to handle counterintelligence investigations of CIA employees. In May 1994, President Clinton established a seven-member National Counterintelligence Policy Board to end the 47-year bureaucratic struggle, sometimes exceedingly acrimonious, between the FBI and CIA.
NSA - National Security Agency - had been regarded as the "Big Ears" and "Big Eyes" of the United States until the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was officially acknowledged after more than a decade of its being a not really "open" secret. The sprawling NSA headquarters complex along the Baltimore-Washington Parkway at Fort Meade [and assorted outlying complexes near Baltimore-Washington International Airport and other sites scattered around the state of Maryland] has two critical functions: maintaining communications security for the United States and breaking the codes of other countries. To carry out that mission, the NSA employs thousands of mathematicians, engineers, computer programmers, cryptanalysts, traffic analysts, linguists and translators backed by banks of antennas, tape recordings and an army of supercomputers looking for the algorithms that will allow a military or diplomatic code to be unraveled. Recent reports put the NSA budget at $4 billion.
Encrypted communications from diplomats, the military including missile-test telemetry and spies get closest attention; but communications broadcast "in the clear" are important. These communications use telephone channels flowing through commercial communications satellites carrying long-distance and international voice telephonic conversations, cellular telephone calls from homes and vehicles, facsimile images, and computer modem messages including e-mail. NSA long has been reported to have computerized equipment to zero in on calls to and from particular telephones of interest, record every conversation and either automatically translate them in fifty languages or to screen them for words of interest. This is one reason that many organized criminals, terrorists and spies use coded phrases or euphemisms.
The vast flow of unencrypted communications around the world may have intelligence or commercial value for the United States. The enormous flood of reports on the world's wire services, newspapers, radio and television broadcasts provide a vast amount of open source information - political, economic, environmental - more than all the world's spies ever could. Organized crime and drug cartel funds shifted by wire transfers from one money laundry to another are of interest; so, too, might be the indiscreet conversations of a diplomat in one country to family or colleagues in another. Engineering designs sent between two factories of a foreign defense company may be of interest for industrial and economic intelligence. Several months after the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, for example, investigators reportedly found there were large wire transfers of cash from Iran to the accounts of Ahmed Jibril's Damascus-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). While no report specifically stated that the NSA gleaned the information from the airways, it may have Thus it is extremely useful that U.S. intelligence can intercept and decrypt a great deal of information.
In the past, complex and rigorous encryption methods were available only to governments for diplomatic, military and intelligence codes that are changed regularly. For enhanced security, one-time codes often are used. Of course, no encryption system is infallible. Agents may steal encryption codes. With plenty of computer time - expensive computer time - even the very large numbers used as encryption keys can be factored. The NSA evidently plans to take the high-technology route. Last August, NSA awarded the Cray Computer Corporation a $4.2 million contract to develop a new type of supercomputer.
The development of cheap and good encryption software for the general public with the advent of the personal computer horrified NSA. Pretty Good Privacy, one very popular data-protection program, was available on the Internet as shareware. Heightened business and private awareness of the ease with which computer hackers and industrial espionage agents can intercept private banking data, take credit card numbers from computer shopping networks, pry into proprietary business data and communications has led to a growing private-sector market for encryption. The NSA's solution was to try an end run around private encryption by secretly developing the "clipper chip" - an electronic backdoor key.
The "clipper chip" was supported by the FBI and other federal law-enforcement agencies and the Clinton administration introduced legislation mandating its use in all U.S.-made electronic communications media - computers, modems, faxes, telephones, and so forth. The "clipper chip" was and is strongly resisted by the telecommunications and computer industries. The computer industry in particular noted that the "clipper chip" would destroy the U.S. export industry since no foreigner would willingly buy machines created to facilitate American eavesdropping. No one in the computer industry believes that the NSA "clipper" does not have some built-in way for the government to easily decrypt any message sent using it. Though the administration backed away from mandating use of the "clipper chip," it intends to mandate its presence in all commu- nications equipment purchased by the U.S. government, hoping to use the enormous purchasing power of the federal government to make the "clipper chip" the de facto standard. The issue has not died out. Expect the "clipper chip" controversy to return.
The NSA works intimately with Britain's GCHQ. NSA's greatest embarrassment in recent years was the discovery that a drunken, drug-using former employee, Ronald Pelton, had sold secrets of U.S. intercepts under the Sea of Okhotsk to Moscow.
NRO - National Reconnaissance Office - is the top secret agency formed in 1960 that designs and operates America's "national means of intelligence" - her spy satellites - and is responsible for imaging and data processing. Though the existence of the NRO has been known since the early 1980s when sources leaked its existence hidden in the Directorate of Special Projects of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the NRO was only officially acknowledged recently. In August 1994, the NRO received most unwelcome attention. Satellites are costly. The NRO budget is estimated at $7 billion. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence publicly accused the intelligence community of improperly concealing from Congress the rising cost of a $310 million headquarters for the NRO near Chantilly, Virginia. The "cover" for construction was that it was an office building being built for a major defense contractor. In Senate hearings on August 10, Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey irritated the Senators by listing the number of times the Intelligence Committee had been briefed in secret on the NRO headquarters. In July 1994, the Wall Street Journal noted that the NRO had awarded Martin Marietta a contract worth more than $2 billion to develop and build a new generation of sensing satellites. The contract initially was awarded to TRW, but was reopened after complaints from Martin Marietta and Lockheed.
The NRO operates a battery of satellites with a wide assortment of imaging capabilities. Some are now well known like the Rhyolite or "Big Bird" and the low- altitude KH-11 "Keyhole" series. Reportedly, satellites have capabilities including digital image sensing in real time, infrared sensors to give early warning of ballistic missile launches, SIGINT capabilities to pick up telemetry from missile tests, side-looking radars capable of imaging while the satellite is near the horizon, and radar imaging capable of penetrating cloud cover and even vegetation. Allegedly, the current satellites are so sensitive they can detect a single Russian border guard lighting his cigarette. A great blow to the U.S. sensing satellites came after a low- level ex-CIA employee, William Kampiles, stole the operating manual for the KH-11 and sold it to the KGB in 1978. After a short time, the Russians realized the fine resolution of the cameras and that it broadcast its images in real time to distant processing centers in places like Australia. The Soviets started putting missiles and aircraft under wraps, camouflage became a Russian military high art, missile test telemetry was encrypted. Clearly Moscow now was aware of the capabil- ities of the Keyhole through which the United States was looking. Kampiles was caught and sentenced to a forty- year federal prison term.
URUGUAY
DII - Directorate of Information and Intelligence - Uruguay's intelligence directorate.
SID - Defense Intelligence Service - Uruguay.
SIDE - Army Intelligence Service - Uruguay.
VENEZUELA
DIM - Military Intelligence Directorate - of Venezuela.
DISIP - Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services. Venezuela's intelligence and counterintelligence.
VIETNAM
Despite the advent in 1987 of the policy of doi moi [reform], Vietnam's version of perestroika, and the recent commencement of formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Hanoi, Vietnam remains a milita- rized country - at least for the time being. Military veterans head the government - President Le Duc Ahn, 85, for example, is a four-star army general and Prime Minister Vo Vann Kiet, 73, is a senior general.
The Interior Ministry, which has been growing in authority in recent years as a result of doi moi, has responsibilities for counterintelligence and secret police operations. The Interior Ministry's Tong Cuc Phan Gian [Counterintelligence General Department] is headed by Major General Duong Thong, and according to 1995 visitors to Hanoi is motivated by a hatred for all things American. The most important intelligence and counter- intelligence organizations operate under the General Political Department of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
A Glossary of Intelligence Terms
Accommodation address. A mail address, usually a post office box, for communication between agents and case officers.
Agent. An individual who acts under the direction of an intelligence agency or security service to obtain, or assist in obtaining, information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. The term is commonly misused in the media to mean an intelligence officer.
Agent of influence. An individual who can be used by a intelligence service to covertly influence foreign officials, opinion molders, organizations, or pressure groups in a way that generally will advance the government's objectives, or to undertake specific action in support of U.S. government objectives.
Agent provocateur. An individual, employed by an agency urging illegal acts by those under suspicion.
Analysis. A stage in the intelligence processing cycle whereby collected information is reviewed to identify significant facts. The information is compared and collated with other data, and conclusions that also incorporate the memory and judgement of the intelligence analyst are derived from it.
Assessment. Part of the intelligence process whereby an analyst determines the reliability or validity of a piece of information; also, a statement resulting from this process.
Asset. Any resource - a person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply - at the disposition of an intelligence agency for use in an operational or support role. The term is normally applied to a person who is contributing to a CIA clandestine mission, but is not a fully controlled agent of the CIA.
Bagman. An agent who pays bribes or carries money for distribution.
Bigot list. A restrictive list of persons who have access to a particular and highly sensitive class of information. Bigot is read to mean narrow.
Black. Indicates reliance on concealment of an illegal activity, rather than on cover.
Black bag job. Warrantless surreptitious entry, especially conducted for purposes other than microphone installation, such as physical search and seizure, photographing documents or downloading computer files.
Black propaganda. Propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. If no attribution is given, it is called gray propaganda.
Blow. To expose - often unintentionally - personnel, installations, or other elements of a clandestine activity or organization.
Brainwashed. A person who has been the subject of psychological techniques to alter thought processes and loyalty.
Bug. A concealed listening device or microphone or other audio surveillance device; also, to install the means for audio surveillance of a subject or target.
Bugged. Contains a concealed listening device.
Burnt. Compromised. Can be used in relation to an individual or an operation.
Burst transmission. A present message transmitted rapidly to thwart hostile direction-finding surveillance.
Case. An intelligence operation in its entirety; also, a record of the development, methods, and objectives of an operation.
Case officer. An Operations Directorate officer of the CIA responsible for handling agents.
Cell. The basic unit of a covert espionage network.
Chekist. Member of the Russian intelligence services, from Cheka, the first Soviet security service.
Cipher. Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary symbols or groups of symbols represent units of plain text.
Clandestine intelligence. Intelligence information collected via covert resources.
Classification. The determination that official information requires, in the interest of national security, a specific degree of protection from unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made. The designation normally is termed a security classification.
Cobbler. A forger, a slang term popular with the British.
Code. A system of communication in which arbitrary groups of symbols represent units of plain text. Codes may be used for brevity or security.
Code word. A word assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information regarding a planned operation.
Collection. The acquisition of information by any means and its delivery to the proper intelligence processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.
COMINT. Communications intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by someone other than the intended recipient; sometimes used interchangeably with SIGINT. It does not include foreign press, propaganda or public broadcasts.
Company, the. Insiders' name for the Central Intelligence Agency.
Compartmentation. The practice of establishing channels for handling sensitive intelligence information. The channels are limited to individuals with a specific need for such information and who are therefor given special security clearances in order to have access to it.
COMSEC. Communications security. The protection of U.S. telecommunications from exploitation by foreign intelligence services and from unauthorized disclosure. COMSEC is one of the mission responsibilities of NSA. It includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security of classified equipment, material, and documents.
Consumer. A person or agency that uses information or intelligence produced either by its own staff or other agencies.
Control. Physical or psychological pressure exerted on an agent or group to ensure that the agent or group responds to the direction from an intelligence agency or service.
Co-opted worker. A citizen of the country who is not an officer or employee of the country's intelligence service, but who assists that service on a temporary or regular basis. In most circumstances, a co-opted worker is an official of the country, but might also be a tourist, businessman, scientist or student, for example.
Counterespionage. Those aspects of counterintelligence concerned with aggressive operations against another intelligence service to reduce its effectiveness or to detect and neutralize foreign espionage. This is done by identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities in order to destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent such espionage activities.
Counterinsurgency. Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, civic, and any other actions taken by a government to defeat rebellion and subversion within a country.
Counterintelligence. Activities conducted to destroy the effectiveness of foreign intelligence operations and to protect information against espionage, individual against subversion, and installations against sabotage; also refers to information developed by or used in counterintelligence operations. See also Counterespionage.
Courier. A messenger responsible for the secure physical transmission and delivery of documents and materials.
Cousins. British MI6 [Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)] name for CIA.
Cover. A protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to prevent identification with clandestine activities and to conceal the true affiliation of personnel and the true sponsorship of their activities.
Cover-name. An alias.
Covert action. A clandestine activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy, and that conceals the identity of the sponsor or else permits the sponsor's plausible denial of the operation; sometimes called covert operations, clandestine operations, and clandestine activity.
Cryptanalysis. The breaking of codes and ciphers into plain text without initial knowledge of the key employed in the encryption.
CRYPTO. A designation applied to classified, cryptographic information that involves special rules for access and handling.
Cryptography. The enciphering of a plain text so that it will be unintelligible to an unauthorized reader or recipient.
Cut-out. A person used to conceal contact between members of a clandestine activity or organization.
Damage assessment. An evaluation of the impact of a compromise in terms of loss of intelligence information, sources, or methods, which may describe and/or recommend measures to minimize damage and prevent future compromises.
Dangle. Someone who intentionally draws the attention of a hostile intelligence service so that, through mere contact, information may be learned about that service.
DCI. Director of Central Intelligence. The President's principal foreign intelligence advisor, appointed by him with the consent of the Senate to be the head of the intelligence community and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and to discharge those authorities and responsibilities as they are prescribed by law and by Presidential and National Security Council directives.
DCID. Director of Central Intelligence Directive. A directive issued by the DCI that outlines general policies and procedures to be followed by intelligence agencies under his direction; usually more specific than a National Security Council Directive (see NSCID).
Defector. A person who, for political or other reasons, repudiates and flees his country, usually to an adversary nation interested in what intelligence he could provide about the country of origin.
Defense intelligence community. Refers to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the military services' intelligence offices including Department of Defense (DOD) collectors of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
Desk man. Controller or sub-controller at headquarters.
DIA. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Department of Defense agency responsible for producing military intelligence, created by directive of the Secretary of Defense in 1961.
Disinformation. False or misleading information to confuse or discredit the opposition.
Double agent. A person engaging in clandestine activity for two or more intelligence or security services who provide information to one service about the other, or about each service to the other, and who is wittingly or unwittingly manipulated by one service against the other.
Drop. Clandestine transference of intelligence information. Leaving material in a secret place for pick-up later is a dead drop, as opposed to a live drop, when people meet to pass material. The word "Dubok" is Russian for a dead drop.
ECM. Electronic countermeasures. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic countermeasures include electronic jamming, which is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing the use of electronic equipment used by an adversary; and electronic deception, which is similar but is intended to mislead an adversary in the interpretation of information received by his electronic system.
Elicitation. The acquisition of intelligence from a person or group which does not disclose the intent of the interview or conversation; a human intelligence (see HUMINT) collection technique generally of an overt nature, unless the collector is other than what he or she purports to be.
ELINT. Electronic intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from the collection (or interception) and processing of foreign electromagnetic radiations (noncommunications) emanating from sources such as radar.
Espionage. Clandestine collection of intelligence.
Executive action. Generally a euphemism for assassination, used by the CIA to describe a program aimed at overthrowing certain foreign leaders, by assassinating them if necessary.
Fabricator. An agent who provides false information.
False flag. A recruitment involving a deliberate misrepresentation of one's actual employer to achieve the recruitment.
Farm, the. Training school for CIA at Camp Peary in Virginia.
Field man. An agent in place and working.
Flap. A commotion, controversy, or publicity that is the result of a bungled intelligence operation.
Flaps and seals man. Expert at undetected opening and closing of the mails.
Flutter. To conduct a polygraph or lie detector test, CIA term.
Friends. A British term of reference used by MI5 for MI6.
Galoshes day. When galoshes were issued by the KGB to its officials for winter work - "a bad day."
Gebist. Russian slang for the SVRR officer, formerly used for KGB officers.
Gray propaganda. See Black propaganda.
Hard target. A country, installation or institution that is difficult for an agent to penetrate. Thus, also soft target meaning the reverse.
Honey trap. Operation to compromise an opponent sexually.
HUMINT. Human intelligence. Intelligence information derived from human sources.
IC. Intelligence community. Refers, in the aggregate, to the following American executive branch organizations: the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, intelligence elements of the military services, counterintelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury, intelligence elements of the Department of Energy, intelligence elements of the Drug Enforcement Administration and staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Illegal. An officer or employee of an intelligence organization who is dispatched abroad and who has no overt connection with the intelligence organization with which he is connected or with the government operating that intelligence organization.
Illegal residency. An intelligence apparatus established in a foreign country and composed of one or more intelligence officers, and which has no apparent connection with the sponsoring intelligence organization or with the government of the country operating the intelligence organization.
Illness. Russian slang term for arrest.
Infiltration. The placing of an agent or other person in a target area within hostile territory or within targeted groups or organizations.
Informant. A person who wittingly or unwittingly provides information voluntarily, under pressure or for money to any agent, intelligence, or counterintelligence or law enforcement agency. In reporting such information, this person will often be cited as the "source."
Informer. Pejorative term for an informant.
INR. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The U.S. Department of State's intelligence service.
In place. A recruited agent who has not physically defected and remains in his official position is said to be an "agent in place."
Intelligence analyst. A professional employee of an intelligence organization who engages in analysis of information gathered by clandestine and open means.
Intelligence cycle. The steps by which information is assembled, converted into intelligence, and made available to consumers. The cycle comprises four basic phases: (1) director, the determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, tasking of collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of these agencies; (2) collection, the exploitation of information sources and the delivery of the collected information to the proper intelligence processing unit for use in the production of intelligence; (3) processing, the steps whereby information becomes intelligence through evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation; and (4) dissemination, the distribution of information or intelligence products in oral, written, or graphic form to departmental and agency intelligence consumers.
Intelligence estimate. An appraisal of intelligence elements relating to a specific situation or condition to determine the courses of action open to an enemy or potential enemy and the probable order of their adoption.
Intelligence officer. A professional employee of an intelligence organization who engages in clandestine intelligence activities.
Interception. Generally refers to the collection of electromagnetic signals such as radio communications by sophisticated collection equipment without the knowledge of the communicants for the production of certain forms of signals intelligence.
Interrogation. A systematic effort to procure information by direct questioning of a person under the control of the questioner.
Invisible ink. The oldest tool still used by spies. Lemons are still useful when technology fails.(See also Secret Writing)
Legend. Invented name and biography to hide the identity of a spy.
MI. Military intelligence. Basic, current, or estimative intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity.
Microdot. Photograph of a message reduced for concealment to microscopic size.
Mole. A penetration agent, an individual working for a foreign intelligence service within his own country's intelligence organization; the term was popularized in the novels of John LeCarree [David Cornwall].
Monitoring. The observing of, listening to, or recording of foreign or domestic communications for intelligence collection or intelligence security (e.g., COMSEC) purposes.
Music box. Radio transmitter.
Naked. Operating without back-up or cover.
Nash. "One of ours," Russian for a recruited agent.
National intelligence. Intelligence produced by the CIA that bears on the broad aspects of U.S. national policy and national security. It is of concern to more than one department or agency.
Neighbor. Other branch of intelligence service.
Network. A spy ring working for one chief.
NFIB. National Foreign Information Board. A body formed to provide the Director of Central Intelligence with advice concerning: production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; the protection of intelligence sources or methods; activities of common concern; and such other matters as are referred to it by the DCI. The board is composed of the DCI (chairman) and other appropriate officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the DCI, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, the offices within the Department of Defense for reconnaissance programs, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; senior intelligence officers of the army, navy, and air force participate as observers; a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may also attend meetings as an observer.
NIA. National Intelligence Authority. An executive council created by President Truman's executive order of January 22, 1946, which had authority over the simultaneously created Central Intelligence Group (see CIG); predecessor of the National Security Council.
NIE. National Intelligence Estimate. An estimate authorized by the DCI of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations; represents the composite view of the intelligence community.
NSC. National Security Council. Established by the National Security Act of 1947 and placed within the Executive Office of the President in 1949, the NSC advises the President on matters relating to national security with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies; comprised of the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, with the Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as advisors.
NSCID. National Security Council Intelligence Directive. Intelligence guidelines issued by the NSC to intelligence agencies. NSCIDs are often augmented by more specific Director of Central Intelligence Directives and by internal departmental or agency regulations. See also DCID.
Onetime pad. Simple encoding method with five letter groups used only once.
Order of battle. Information regarding the identity, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of any military force.
Overt. Legally gathered information from published or quotable sources.
Paper mill. A fabricator who provides false information consistently and in volume; see also Fabricator.
Paroles. Key words for mutual identification among agents.
Piscine. Literally, swimming pool. Headquarters of the French DGSE.
Penetration. The recruitment of agents within or the planting of agents or technical monitoring devices within a target organization to gain access to its secrets or to influence its activities.
PHOTINT. Photographic intelligence. Information or intelligence derived from photography through photographic interpretation.
Pickle Factory. Insiders' name for the Central Intelligence Agency.
Pitch. The act of persuading a person to be an agent; a pitch made without the benefit of any prior cultivation of the person in question is a cold pitch.
Plain text. Unencrypted communications; specifically, the original message of a cryptogram expressed in ordinary language.
Playback. Information which captured or compromised agents are forced to continue transmitting.
Plumbing. Assets or services supporting the operations of CIA field stations, such as safe houses, unaccountable funds, investigative persons, surveillance teams.
Pocket litter. The misleading documents and materials an agent carries to protect his identity and cover background if apprehended.
Polygraph. A lie detector. A machine to indicate whether a suspect is lying by measuring nervous reflexes.
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). A group of prominent private citizens appointed by the American President to advise him on matters of foreign intelligence. PFIAB's influence varies with each administration. It has been used as a supplementary Inspectorate General over clandestine operations.
Principal agent. An agent who recruits other agents and then manages the resulting network.
Product. Finished intelligence reports disseminated by intelligence agencies to appropriate consumers.
Proprietaries. Ostensibly private commercial entities capable of doing business, which are established and controlled by intelligence services to conceal governmental affiliation of intelligence personnel and/or governmental sponsorship of certain activities in support of clandestine operations.
Raven. Originally a Russian term for a male seducer used to lure a woman into sexual compromise; see also honey trap.
Raw intelligence. A colloquial term meaning collected intelligence information that has not yet been analyzed and converted into intelligence product.
Resident director. Russian: "Rezident"; the chief of a Soviet or Russian foreign intelligence group, the rezidentura, operating under official cover from an embassy.
Requirement. A general or specific request for intelligence information made by a member of the intelligence community.
Safe house. A seemingly innocent house, apartment or premises maintained by an intelligence organization for conducting clandestine or covert activity in relative security.
Sanitize. To delete from or revise a report or document to prevent identification of the intelligence sources and methods that contributed to or are dealt with in the report.
Secret writing. Messages written with an invisible substance, ranging from lemon juice to sophisticated chemicals that appear under certain conditions.
Sensitive. Requires special protection from disclosure, which could cause embarrassment, compromise or threat to the security of the sponsoring power.
Sheep dipping. Using a military instrument (e.g an airplane) or officer in clandestine operations, usually in a civilian capacity or under civilian cover, although the instrument or officer will covertly retain its or his military ownership or standing. Also, placing individuals in organizations or groups in which they can become active in order to establish credentials so that they can be used to collect information of intelligence interest on similar groups.
Shoe. False passport.
SIGINT. Signals intelligence. The interception, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information derived from foreign electrical communications and other signals; includes communications intelligence (see COMINT) and electronics intelligence (see ELINT).
Sleeper. A previously placed spy ready to be activated at a suitable moment.
Source. A person, device, system or activity from which intelligence information is obtained.
Spook. American slang for a spy.
Sterilize. To remove from material to be used in overt and clandestine actions any marks or devices that can identify it as originating with the sponsoring organization or nation.
Strategic intelligence. Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans and operations at the national and international levels.
Stringer. An occasional or free-lance spy; same term as is used for a free-lance journalist.
Surveillance. Systematic monitoring or observation of a target.
Swallow. Russian for a female seducer used to lure a man into a honey trap; generally in plentiful supply among the Russian nationals employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
Swim. To travel (Russian).
Tactical intelligence. Intelligence supporting military plans and operations at the military unit level. Tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ only in scope, point of view, and level of employment.
Take, the. Intelligence fruits of spying.
Target. A person, agency, facility, area, or country against which intelligence operations are directed.
Targeting. With regard to COMINT, the intentional selection and/or collection of telecommunications for intelligence purposes.
Target of opportunity. An entity (e.g., government entity, installation, political organization, or individual) that becomes available to an intelligence agency or service by chance, and provides the opportunity for the collection of needed information.
Tapping. Telephonic intercepts.
Terminated with Extreme Prejudice. American slang for murdered.
Tradecraft. The techniques of espionage; also, the technical equipment used in such activity, such as electronic eavesdropping equipment and miniaturized radios.
Turned. Persuaded or bribed to change sides.
Walk-in. Anyone who walks in volunteering services or information, usually a foreigner who enters another nations' embassy.
Watchers. Officers keeping persons under surveillance.
Watch list. A list of words, such as names, entities or phrases, that can be employed by a computer to select required information from a mass of data.
Wet job. Russian: "Mokri dela" ["wet affair"], an operation in which blood is shed, a murder.
Witting. Knowing, conscious as in a "witting conspirator."
